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1 Executive summary
This report describes the first analysis from the Low Carbon London (LCL), residential
Demand Side Response (DSR) trial which took place in the London area during 2013.
It has been written in conjunction with a companion report, A2: Residential consumer
attitudes to time-varying pricing [1], which addresses the experiences and attitudes of
households on the residential dynamic-Time-Of-Use (dTOU) tariﬀ.
About the programme
The LCL programme [2] is a technology demonstrator financed by the GB electricity con-
sumers via the Low Carbon Network Fund (LCNF) which is administered by the Oﬃce of
Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem). The programme was commissioned to demonstrate
and gather performance data on a number of innovative ‘smart grid’ technologies, of which
residential sector demand response was one.
This trial was conducted by a partnership of industry stakeholders organisations and
academia. Key partners in the design and implementation of this trial included:
• UK Power Networks: The London distribution network operator (DNO) and the
lead programme partner.
• Imperial College London: Trial planning, data analysis and the authors of this report.
• EDF Energy: Retail energy supplier.
• Siemens: Information and Communication Technology (ICT) framework.
• Logica: Smart meter head-end.
Motivation
To meet decarbonisation targets, approximately 20% of GB electricity demand will be met
by renewable generation in 2020 [3], while the electricity generation system is expected
to be largely decarbonised by 2030 [4]. Furthermore, this may be accompanied by the
electrification of segments of the heat and transport sectors. This development will pose
two major challenges:
(a) Significant penetration of intermittent wind power and an increased contribution
from less flexible low carbon generation may massively reduce the eﬃciency of the
demand-supply balancing task if delivered by generation, as at present. This will
limit the ability of the system accommodate low carbon generation leading to a
significant increase in operating costs and carbon emissions. Hence, enabling demand
side of the electricity system to follow the supply side will bring significant savings.
(b) Load growth and integration of low carbon demand technologies, such as electric ve-
hicles and heat pumps, will stress the electricity distribution network infrastructure
and may lead to significant network reinforcements. Hence, reducing peak demand
through demand response could postpone or displace network investment and facili-
tate a cost eﬀective transition to a lower carbon future.
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This trial, through dTOU tariﬀs, investigates the potential value of residential demand
response to the Supplier, where it may contribute to system balancing through Supply
Following (SF) actions, enhancing the ability of the system to integrate low carbon gener-
ation, and to the DNO, where it may be used for network Constraint Management (CM),
displacing or deferring network reinforcement costs. Both use cases are examined here in
unison so that their potential conflicts and synergies may be better observed.
The trial of a dTOU tariﬀ was a pioneering eﬀort of the Low Carbon London programme
in examining the contribution that the domestic sector can make towards facilitating
the cost eﬀective integration of low carbon generation and demand technologies, while
providing rewards to consumers for services provided. With the UK government’s plan
to roll-out smart meters by 2020, there exists the opportunity for consumers to make
significant savings on their energy bills [5] while supporting a cost eﬀective transition to
a low carbon future.
Trial design
5,533 households with smart meters were recruited onto the trial from the London Power
Networks (LPN) area. All households agreed to have their half-hourly consumption data
analysed as part the LCL project, and a subset of 1,119 households additionally signed
up to receive a dTOU tariﬀ. At the end of the trial, valid data for the 2013 calendar
year was available for 922 households on the dTOU tariﬀ and 3,437 households on the
non-Time-Of-Use (nonTOU) tariﬀ.
The dTOU tariﬀ contained three diﬀerent price bands, deliberately chosen to have a
strong high to low price ratio, though still designed so that an average consumer’s bill
would be the same on the flat rate tariﬀ of the nonTOU group should there be no change
in consumption profile. The values of the price bands were:
• High price: 67.20 pence/kWh
• Mid price: 11.76 pence/kWh
• Low price: 3.99 pence/kWh
The standard flat rate tariﬀ of the nonTOU group was 14.228 pence/kWh.
The middle price point was used as a baseline tariﬀ and the high and low price points
were used to generate trial events of two distinct types, adapted to specific use cases:
• Constraint Management (CM): These events aimed to measure the potential for
dTOU-mediated demand response to relieve distribution network constraints, thus
deferring costly network expansion and increasing asset utilisation. These events
therefore targeted peak demand periods according to season and time-of-day, as
identified using Elexon1 Profile Class 1 data. In order to incentivise the greatest
possible demand reduction during the peak period, a high price band during peak
hours was combined with a low price on either side for the remaining duration of
that trial day. Events targeting the same daily peak on subsequent days were also
trialled.
• Supply Following (SF): These events probed the response of households to simple
high or low price signals of varying duration. The objective of these events was
to quantify the potential of dTOU-mediated demand response to aid in energy bal-
ancing. In order to span the range of variable output characteristics of renewable
1Elexon manages the balancing and settlement mechanism in the UK.
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generation such as wind power, a large range of events were trialled. Individual
events consisted of single price changes, either high or low, over a range of event
durations, arranged in time so as to systematically sweep across all times of day.
Each event type was repeated 3 times and distributed randomly throughout the
trial year of 2013. This design enabled the measurement of the participants’ willing-
ness to engage in DSR at diﬀerent times in the day and year, and for diﬀerent event
durations.
Demand Side Response (DSR) is defined as the change in demand induced by a price
event, which requires a comparison of the observed demand with a hypothetical baseline
demand for if the event had not occurred. A linear regression model was created to
compute a per-household baseline demand level based on that household’s relation to the
nonTOU group, modulated by additional temporal factors (hour of day, day of week). By
coupling the baseline to the behaviour of the nonTOU group, it correctly accounts for
non-standard days (e.g. bank holidays) and special events.
Key findings
Consumer engagement
Consumers were incentivised to change their electricity consumption in reaction to changes
in the electricity tariﬀ, which was designed to be cost-neutral for households with average
consumption levels. Therefore a reduction in the annual bill on the dTOU tariﬀ compared
to the flat rate tariﬀ is a first indicator of consumers engaging with the trial. Over the
trial year, 95% of households saved money relative to what they would have spent had
they been on the standard flat tariﬀ of the nonTOU group.
Although the observed decrease in annual bills is a good indicator of overall engagement,
this does not necessary extend to individual households. For example, consumers that are
often away during the evening are likely to have missed the CM-type evening peak trials,
resulting in a lower average bills. To classify the engagement of individual households
with the trials a measure of responsiveness to dTOU signals was developed. It determines
the likelihood that the realised annual bill came about by chance, if the household had
paid no attention to the dTOU signal. If this likelihood is very low, it is assumed that
the household has actively responded to the signal, whereas a high likelihood is consistent
with a lack of engagement. The likelihood measures were used to rank all households
according to their perceived responsiveness to dTOU signals.
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Figure 1.1: Household performance rank against measured DSR, by price band.
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Figure 1.1 demonstrates the relation between the responsiveness ranking and the mean
observed demand response across all trials. The panels depict the response to high (left),
mid (centre) and low (right) price signals respectively, and each dot represents a single
household, with its responsiveness ranking on a range of 1 to 922 shown on the x-axis. The
estimated demand response is computed by averaging the deviations from the estimated
baseline consumption over the period in which the relevant price (high/mid/low) is applied.
As expected, highly engaged households (low rank index) tend to decrease their con-
sumption in response to high price signals and increase their consumption in response to
low price signals, and the magnitude of the response generally decreases with increasing
rank index. The figure also illustrates an interesting feature of the responsiveness rank-
ing method: the highest ranked households are not necessarily the ones with the highest
absolute change in demand in response to price signals. This is because the method does
not quantify directly the magnitude of the response to price signals, but its consistency
and the degree to which it can be ascribed to chance. This means households with limited
means of demand response may still rank highly if fluctuations in the consumption are
clearly linked to the dTOU signal.
The ranking of households according to their responsiveness also plays a key role in
the extrapolation of results. The highly ranked households are assumed to be indicative
of future consumers that are increasingly responding to dTOU signals, either manually
or mediated by home automation devices and services. To capture this, households were
classified into four groups according to their responsiveness ranking. Throughout the
report, results are often reported for the most engaged 25%, 50% and 75% of households
in addition to the whole trial group (100%).
Reduction of peak demand levels
The CM events were consistently able to reduce peak demand levels. Figure 1.2 shows
a CM event designed to achieve weekday evening peak reduction over two consecutive
days. The background colour indicates the active price band and the dark line shows the
observed demand levels. The inferred changes in demand compared to the baseline are
drawn in red (increase) and blue (decrease). The lighter curve shows the same results
restricted to the 25% of best responding households.
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Figure 1.2: A CM event showing evening peak reduction over three consecutive weekdays.
The lighter shaded Increase, Reduction and Actual indicate the response from
the most engaged 25% of households.
For the event shown in figure 1.2, a sizeable reduction in demand can be seen during the
high price periods. The participating households reduced their demand during the high
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price periods by approximately 10%, from a maximum demand of 0.77 kW/household
to 0.70 kW/household, with the most engaged households showing a significantly larger
reduction of 20%, from 0.71 kW/household to 0.55 kW/household. This reduction in peak
power consumption persisted across both event days. The reduction in load during high
price periods was accompanied by an increase in load during the adjacent low price periods.
These features – peak reduction, persistence and load shifting – were consistently observed
for CM events, with peak reduction values between 5% and 10% on average.
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Figure 1.3: Mean change in demand over the high price period of the CM events (listed
by event label). Bars, from lighter to darker shading, represent the average for
subgroups of the most engaged 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of responders.
Figure 1.3 depicts the observed changes in consumption during high price periods, for
each of the CM-type events in the trial. The event label ‘Px_xD_x’ includes the number
of consecutive days (‘xD’) on which peaks were targeted. The results demonstrate a
robust reduction in average load of approximately 0.05 kW/household, which more than
doubled to a range of 0.08-0.22 kW/household for the subpopulation of the 25% most
responsive households. Such demand reductions may be considered material for future
network planning.
Demand response is time dependent
Targeted high and low price events were used to establish the potential for consumers
to respond to dTOU signals at diﬀerent times of the day and throughout the year. As
expected, households responded to high price signals with decreases in consumption levels
that were much larger during the colder and darker winter months than in the peak of
summer. Curiously, the ability of households to increase power consumption was only
very slightly aﬀected by the time of year. During the summer months in particular this
led to an asymmetric response to high and low price signals.
Figure 1.4 breaks down the average change in demand by half-hourly settlement block,
for both high (red) and low (green) price events. The bars with the darkest shade represent
the mean response of all trial participants, and the progressively lighter bars the results
obtained by analysing the subpopulations of 75%, 50% and 25% best ranked responders.
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Figure 1.4: Full year mean DSR by 30-minute settlement block. SF events only. Bars,
from lighter to darker shading, represent the average for subgroups of the
most engaged 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of responders.
The demand reduction potential (in red) is seen to reach its maximum magnitude around
the morning and evening peaks (on weekdays). The most responsive quarter of households
achieved a mean demand reduction over 0.12 kW/household during these periods, com-
pared to 0.05 kW/household for the average household. The strong correlation between
demand reduction potential and absolute demand levels is a positive finding for the Con-
straint Management use case, as the reduction potential during peak demand periods will
be higher than suggested by average response numbers.
The ability to increase demand levels was fairly constant during the waking hours of the
day, at a level of 0.05 kW/household across all households and exceeding 0.15 kW/household
for the most responsive households. During the night time even the best responders do not
achieve an increase of 0.05 kW/household. This suggests an ability of households to assist
in supply demand balancing, but this potential is currently limited to waking hours and
is significantly larger during winter months. A more consistent response may be possible
using autonomously responding appliances.
Potential conflicts between network and system objectives
The trials specifically addressed the use cases of Constraint Management (CM) and Supply
Following (SF). The CM use case supports the operation and planning of the distribution
network, whereas the SF use case supports supply-demand balancing at the system level.
As the availability of responsive demand increases, these two objectives may lead to con-
flicts that are not present in the current operating practice. For example, an abundance of
available wind power or the availability of large amounts of inflexible nuclear plant during
low load conditions may result in very low electricity prices. From the system perspective
it would be beneficial to use dTOU pricing to incentivise consumers to increase their con-
sumption levels. However, doing so might cause unanticipated stress on the distribution
network.
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Figure 1.5: Demand increase in response to a low price signal. The lighter shaded Increase,
Reduction and Actual indicate the response from the most engaged 25% of
households.
That such a situation is not hypothetical is borne out by the low price event shown in
figure 1.5, where the low price was oﬀered between 5am and 11am on a Friday morning. In
response to this signal, households increased their average power consumption from just
under 0.6 kW to just over 0.7 kW. However, the subpopulation of 25% most responsive
households, which may be indicative of future participation levels, demonstrate a much
larger response. Their morning consumption levels nearly double compared to the baseline;
a change that is suﬃcient to shift the daily consumption peak from the evening to the
morning. If unanticipated and unmanaged, such an event might pose severe diﬃculties for
the DNO.
Socio-economic factors hardly aﬀect response magnitude
The responses of the targeted SF trials were analysed against two principal parameters
that are known to be strong indicators of energy consumption: household occupancy (1, 2,
3+) and a socio-economic classifier based on the Acorn system. The three socio-economic
groups – Aﬄuent, Comfortable and Adversity – can be interpreted as a rough indicator of
wealth.
0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
Mean DSR (kW/household)
Affluent, 1, N=127
Affluent, 2, N=135
Affluent, 3+, N=65
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Adversity, 2, N=78
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Figure 1.6: Mean DSR by LCL Acorn and occupancy class. SF events only. Error bars
displaying the standard error of the mean across households are included to
indicate the significance of the results.
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Figure 1.6 shows the average demand response for these classes. Perhaps surprisingly,
the socio-economic class had no significant eﬀect on the observed demand response for these
single events, although results from CM events suggest that households in the Aﬄuent class
may respond more strongly to signals that specifically target peak hours.
The measured response does depend strongly on occupancy levels, with larger house-
holds providing responses of larger magnitude. An apparent exception is formed by the
larger (3+) Adversity households, which do not exhibit a significantly larger response than
the lower occupancy households, although this finding is only marginally significant.
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2 Introduction
This report describes the first analysis from the Low Carbon London (LCL), residential
Demand Side Response (DSR) trial which took place in the London area during the year
of 2013. It has been written in conjunction with a companion report, A2: Residential con-
sumer attitudes to time-varying pricing [1], which addresses the experiences and attitudes
of households on the residential dynamic-Time-Of-Use (dTOU) tariﬀ.
2.1 About the programme
The LCL programme [2] is a technology demonstrator financed by the GB electricity con-
sumers via the Low Carbon Network Fund (LCNF) which is administered by the Oﬃce of
Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem). The programme was commissioned to demonstrate
and gather performance data on a number of innovative ‘smart grid’ technologies, of which
residential sector demand response was one.
This trial was conducted by a partnership of industry stakeholders organisations and
academia. Key partners in the design and implementation of this trial included:
• UK Power Networks: The London distribution network operator (DNO) and the
lead programme partner.
• Imperial College London: Trial planning, data analysis and the authors of this report.
• EDF Energy: Retail energy supplier.
• Siemens: Information and Communication Technology (ICT) framework.
• Logica: Smart meter head-end.
2.2 Background
Government legislation responding to the risk from climate change, increasing volatility of
international energy markets and energy security, is expected to bring about a dramatic
shift in the way the country supplies and consumes its energy. The Climate Change Act
of 2008 [6] enshrines in law the target of reducing carbon emissions to 20% of 1990 levels
by 2050. Current projections indicate that approximately 30% of GB electricity demand
will be met by renewable generation by 2020 [3], ideally rising to 100% by 2050 [4]. These
changes will bring significant new costs under the existing operating paradigm.
On the supply side, in addition to the fixed costs of the new renewable plant and grid
connections, the following system integration costs will be borne:
• Degradation in utilisation of infrastructure. Though renewable generators can dis-
place energy produced from conventional plant, because they cannot be dispatched,
their ability to replace capacity is limited. Estimates of the capacity value of wind
under the current operating paradigm are around 10% [7]. When combined with the
inflexible output of nuclear and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) plant, this will
lead to increased generation capacity margin and reduced utilisation of conventional
plant.
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• Reduced eﬃciency of system balancing. More operating reserve is required to manage
the risk of a change in wind output [7]. This increased reserve and lack of flexibility
may also reduce the ability of the system to eﬃciently utilise renewable generation.
In other words, more wind energy will be curtailed.
On the demand side, the greatest change will be the shift of heat and transport load onto
the electricity system. At the national level, full penetration of heat pumps and Electric
Vehicles (EVs) could result in a doubling of peak demand with a disproportionately smaller
increase in energy consumption of 50% [8]. Most of the ensuing network reinforcement
costs will fall on the distribution network – up to £4bl per year additional reinforcement
costs by 2040, increasing to £6bn per year by 2050 [5].
The established solution for balancing is to ensure enough flexible generation capacity
exists to meet demand when renewables cannot generate, and provide the necessary reserve
requirement when they do. However, more cost eﬀective balancing technologies may exist.
Alternative such as transmission interconnection, energy storage and DSR have together
been shown to result in savings of up to £15bn by 2040 [5].
This trial looks at the potential value of residential DSR to the DNO, where it may be
used for network Constraint Management (CM), displacing or deferring network reinforce-
ment costs, and to the supplier, where Supply Following (SF) may contribute to system
balancing, reducing the need for conventional capacity margin. They are examined here
in unison so that the potential conflicts and synergies between the two may be better
observed.
The use of DSR for CM and SF will require a dynamically changing tariﬀ, henceforth
referred to as a dTOU tariﬀ. This is in contrast with Time-Of-Use (TOU) tariﬀs, designed
to target the predictable high demand periods in the week but otherwise static, and Critical
Peak Pricing (CPP) tariﬀs, not static but used infrequently and targeting only the highest
demand periods of the year.
UK government plans for the roll-out of smart meters are under way and due to be
completed by 2020. As the specifications of the smart meters [9] have been been designed
with the express purpose of being real-time-DSR-ready, there exists an imminent opportu-
nity, one which could see consumers making very significant savings on their energy bills
[5] while supporting a cost eﬀective transition to a low carbon future.
2.3 Objectives
This trail was designed to investigate the potential value of a dTOU pricing to both the
DNO and retail supplier. The research focuses on:
• Constraint Management (CM): Use of DSR for the management of distribution net-
work constraints, as an alternative to network redundancy.
• Supply Following (SF): Use of DSR for energy balancing, particularly with a view
to increased penetration of variable output renewable generators such as wind.
• Conflicts and synergies between CM and SF use cases.
In order to investigate these, the trial was designed to:
• Demonstrate the CM use case via simulated events in order to better understand its
value and reliability.
• Analyse data on consumer’s willingness to engage in DSR over a range of times (day,
week and season) in order to better understand the potential the SF use case.
13
2 Introduction
• Analyse data on the eﬀect of event duration on response magnitude in order to
inform the design of a potential future rollout of DSR.
• Analyse metadata on household occupancy and social groupings to better understand
DSR enablers and inhibitors, and the potential impacts on consumers.
2.4 Literature review
The objective of this section is to examine related demand response trials in order to inform
expectations, improve design, build upon past learning and contrast results. A number
of recent meta-analysis provide much of the high level detail, with primary literature
referenced for corroboration and for greater detail where necessary. Most relevant to this
trial were results pertaining to the testing of TOU and CPP tariﬀs.
To gain an understanding of the overall landscape of trials, the following meta-analysis
were used:
• The Department of Energy and Climate Change, UK (DECC) (2013) [10]: The most
recent and also the most relevant by virtue of it being commissioned specifically to
inform the design and implementation of future demand response trials (such as this).
Some 30 domestic DSR trials were compared. All trials considered were completed
after the year 2000 and had a focus on measures to shift (rather than to reduce)
demand. Included trials were from North America, Australia, and Europe.
• Faruqui and Palmer (2012) [11]: Focused on 9 of the “best designed”, most recent
experiments to identify the relationship between peak to oﬀ-peak price ratio and
reduction in peak demand. Included trials were from North America and Ireland.
• Ehrhardt-Martinez (2010) [12]: Examined 56 residential sector feedback studies to
provide insight into the factors that influence feedback-induced energy savings. In-
cluded trials were from North America, Europe, Australia and Japan.
• Faruqui and Sergici (2009) [13]: Surveyed the, then, 15 most recent trials with
dynamic pricing of electricity. Included trials were all from North America.
In general, the literature indicates that economic incentives are eﬀective in changing
consumer behaviour, though results have been highly varied. The eﬀect on total energy
consumption is typically small compared to the eﬀect on peak demand.
The Energy Demand Research Project [14] (EDRP) results show an approximate 4%
reduction in weekday peak energy consumption for consumers with in-home display –
though significance was low due to the number (170) of participants being few. By contrast,
the Ireland Electricity Smart Metering Trials [15] (IESMT) showed a 7-12% reduction in
peak demand with participants numbering nearly three thousand. Interestingly, there
appears to be no strong relationship between the size of the diﬀerence between peak and
oﬀ-peak prices, and the size of the consumer response across studies. Results from North
American trials show similarly large variations.
Figure 2.1 shows the variation, in peak reductions across trials covered by the DECC
literature review [10]. Also given, when available, are details of the price diﬀerentials used
(relative to the median price).
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Trial Name Country N Price
diﬀ
min
Price
diﬀ
max
1 Ontario Smart Price Pilot (2006-
2007)
Canada 124 140% 140%
2 Idaho DSR trial (2005-2006) USA 85 184% 184%
3 Missouri CPP trial (2004- 2005) USA 91 349% 349%
4 CL&P Pilot (2009) USA 188 208% 408%
5 PSE’s ToU trial (2001-2002) USA 300000
6 California State-wide Pricing Pilot
(2003-2004)
USA 226 200% 200%
7 myPower Trial (2006-2007) USA 379 187% 187%
8 Norway EFFLOCOM Trial (2001-
2004)
Norway 237
9 Xcel Energy Trial USA 2900
10 PG&E’s Trial (2008-2010) USA 86222
11 Ireland Electricity Smart Metering
Behaviour Trials (2009-2010)
Ireland 2920 143% 271%
Figure 2.1: Summary of past trial peak reductions. Data reproduced from DECC [10].
2.4.1 Overview of existing knowledge
dTOU tariﬀs
There is little evidence relating to the eﬃcacy of dTOU pricing in the UK context. Geo-
graphically closest to the UK, the EFFLOCOM trial in Norway1 found larger peak reduc-
tions when the tariﬀ depended on the spot price of power than when it did not, though
this was based on only 81 households.
Moving to the USA, in Illianos, the Energy-Smart Pricing Plan trial [16] tested a dTOU
tariﬀ in conjunction with automatic cycling of air conditioning load, which was found to
increase consumer demand elasticity by 9.8%. Elasticity was also found to increase as
price increased, and with decreasing household income.
Pacific Northwest looked the use of DSR, in conjunction with distributed generation,
for constraint management [17]. Like the Illianos trial, they augmented price signals with
home automation which was concluded to be “helpful” in increasing responsiveness. Both
TOU and dTOU tariﬀs were tested. Price responses were observed to be stronger for
the TOU tariﬀ, though with only 112 households, evenly split between TOU, dTOU and
1Project report no longer available online, but reviewed by DECC [10].
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control groups, statistical significance was low.
CPP tariﬀs
There is strong evidence that CPP tariﬀs have a greater impact on peak reduction that
TOU tariﬀs. A reduction in peak demand was achieved in all CPP trials reviewed by
DECC, with reduction ranges typically lying between 5% and 38%. Evidence on the eﬀect
of peak to oﬀ-peak price diﬀerentials is mixed, though generally point towards larger price
diﬀerentials resulting in greater peak demand reductions. Notifications for such trials were
typically sent the day before, with peak periods spanning around 5 hours. For trials with
longer duration peak periods, a slight reduction in responsiveness was noted.
Perhaps the the most relevant to the UK is the use of the Tempo tariﬀ, in France. Driven
by the high penetration of inflexible nuclear generators, Electricité de France (EDF), im-
plemented the tariﬀ to allow smoothing of both the annual and daily electricity load curves
[18]. The tariﬀ includes six rates for electricity with day ahead price notifications. The
highest price band may only be used on 22 days of the year, designed to reduce the sys-
tem critical peaks. The tariﬀ also includes regular TOU load profile smoothing elements.
Tempo has led to a reduction in consumption of between 15% and 45% depending on price
band. Furthermore, 90% of customers are reported to be satisfied with the tariﬀ.
Direct load control
A recent meta-analysis by VaasaETT [19] found that automation augmented the response
to price signals by over 100% in many cases. This chimes with the findings of Faruqui and
Palmer [11] which showed the significant impact of enabling technologies for enhancing
the peak reducing eﬀect of residential consumers on TOU pricing tariﬀs. Such results
allude to the long run potential of DSR, when market based pricing is augmented by
home automation.
Radio teleswitching of loads has been practiced within the UK since 1984 [20], allowing
up to 200 MW of load reduction for use by the transmission network operator.
Information provision
Information provision was seen to be the most eﬀective lever to enhance the demand
response eﬀect after direct load control and automation. There are many vectors for such
information, typically by paper bills, but more recently via In-Home Displays (IHDs). In
the IESMT, a combination of TOU with bi-monthly bills, a bespoke energy statement and
an electricity monitor, were found to reduce peak demand by 11.3%. This is in contrast
to TOU tariﬀs without such additional stimuli, where the average was an 8.8% peak
reduction [15]. It is diﬃcult to compare this figure with other key European TOU trials
as the communication method was never an isolated experimental variable. The EDRP
trial, which included two TOU trials, did not measure the eﬀect of IHDs alone. North
American trials have found mixed results while trying to isolate the eﬀect of IHDs, some
even showed a slight negative impact on peak reduction [10].
Household occupancy
Results here were mixed. The EDRP trial and selected North American trials found that
smaller households were more responsive to price changes than larger households. In the
case of EDRP, the marginal increase in peak consumption was seen to be approximately
4% per household member. This increase in peak consumption was slightly lessened to
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an approximate 3.5% when the additional household members were under the age of 16.
Though with only 170 households in this study, such findings are not conclusive. In
contrast, the IESMT found that households with children under the age of 15 were more
responsive to their TOU tariﬀ by 10.7% compared to 6.5%.
Low income consumers
Though there is little evidence from the UK, a meta study [21] looking at five trials in
the USA suggests that low income consumers will benefit from TOU pricing. Indeed,
because of flatter than average load profiles, they may benefit even without changing
their usage profile. Despite this, evidence from these trials also suggests that low income
consumers may have a lower than average response to TOU pricing. Three of the five
trials investigated showed this. Various reasons have been proposed [10], though evidence
is thin. Lower overall electricity use may mean there are less discretionary loads to manage.
Flatter initial loads may reduce scope for load shifting. Or other characteristics such as
housing standard or appliance ownership may be at work.
Change in bills and consumer attitudes
In general this was positive with over 80% of trialists responding positively2. This, however,
is likely to be strongly related to the fact that nearly all trials were designed to be revenue
neutral (no change in bill with no change in demand profile). In this situation, people
who respond appropriately to price signals, even minutely, are guaranteed to make a net
saving from their previous tariﬀ. Suﬃce to say, most consumers across such trials saved
money.
Electrification of heat and transport
Penetrations levels for such technology within Europe are low and, as such, there is little
evidence from trials for the flexibility of these new loads with respect to DSR. Early data
from EV trials suggests that consumers may be content to charge their vehicles overnight
rather than at peak times. However, as numbers of participants have been low, results lack
robustness and therefore estimates of the DSR flexibility of EVs are still largely theoretical.
As heat pumps are eﬀectively air conditioning units in reverse, it may be possible to assume
similar flexibility characteristics, though there are many local variables which could aﬀect
this.
Persistence
As trials are by nature temporary, there is little evidence available on the long run per-
sistence of DSR beyond two years (most trials tend to last for one year). Of the four US
trials examined by DECC with durations greater than a year, only one [22] showed lower
peak demand reductions in the second year relative to the first. Closer to the UK, the
IESMT saw peak reductions increase in the second half of the year relative to the first.
With respect to UK applicability, evidence for long run persistence is thin.
2Survey questions were not consistent across trials, though it is reasonable to interpret a positive response
from greater than 80% of the answers. For example, words to the eﬀect that the consumer would
willingly choose to remain on the tariﬀ, should the option be provided.
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2.4.2 Summary of knowledge gaps
From the preceding section, knowledge gaps relevant to this trial may be summarised as:
1. dTOU tariﬀs have not been tested in the UK.
2. Evidence on dTOU tariﬀs from comparable countries (which may be extrapolated
to the UK) is thin.
3. Evidence and reasons for diﬀering responses from vulnerable or low-income con-
sumers is thin.
4. Evidence on the types of loads shifted is thin.
5. Evidence on the eﬀect of household occupancy is mixed.
6. Evidence on DSR persistence is thin.
7. Evidence on the eﬀects of non-economic incentives alone is mixed.
8. Data on the response of consumers to price diﬀerentials is thin.
9. Data on the eﬀect and extent of the electrification of heat and transport is thin.
2.4.3 Discussion of research opportunities
More data on low-income and vulnerable consumers may be obtained by targeting DSR
trial recruitment such that statistically significant numbers are selected from low income
and vulnerable consumer classes. This could be augmented by consumer surveys to ob-
tain data on the types of appliances that consumers are shifting. Data on the eﬀects of
household occupancy should be obtained in a similar manner, by choosing trial areas and
targeting recruitment until statistically significant numbers of the chosen occupancy levels
are obtained. This is now being studied in a related LCNF project [23].
Data on the persistence of peak load reductions can only be obtained from longer trials
or commercial oﬀerings. Increasing trial duration or designing trials which may transition
into commercially viable operations would help.
Evidence on the eﬀect of information provision and its vector were mixed. Future
experimental design should be informed by this. If the experiment is designed to test
information interventions, all other variables should be held constant to as greater degree
as reasonably possible. If the experiment is not designed to test such interventions, the
information provided to consumers, and the vector by which it is provided, should remain
a constant of the experiment.
Obtaining more data on the eﬀect of price diﬀerentials would require designing exper-
iments with significant numbers of participants, at least three or more price points and
a suﬃcient range of prices to make it possible to deduce trends (should they exist) from
results. As there are many time related variables which cannot be controlled in trials,
ensuring the pricing schedule is designed to minimise noise while appropriately spanning
seasons will be important.
Understanding the eﬀect of dTOU pricing must include an experimental approach. The
complexity and subjectivity of residential demand makes it is unlikely that theory alone
can inform its adoption. Attention to statistically significant samples sizes, appropriate
social stratification and good experimental design will be crucial in ensuring the quality
of results.
Until penetration levels for EVs increase it will be diﬃcult to obtain statistically sig-
nificant experimental results on their demand response potential, or indeed the network
issues they may pose. In order to make best use of the information available, current
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eﬀorts are geared towards increasing penetration levels and the international sharing of
research data. Green eMotion [24] is the largest such programme in Europe. Combining
international data with local data such as driver patterns and consumer preferences may
be the best approach for now. In the UK, plans to test small fleets of instrumented EVs in
order to obtain information on driver patterns and charging preferences, as well channeling
investment into EV charging infrastructure, are underway in major cities. Here, LCL fills
some of the knowledge gaps with the companion report B1: Impact and opportunities for
wide-scale electric vehicle deployment [25].
Data on the eﬀect of heat pumps on the network and their potential to engage in demand
response is in a similar condition to that of EVs, though their situation is somewhat
diﬀerent. As heat pumps will be replacing conventional heating systems with little to no
diﬀerence in service dynamics (unlike electric vehicles which have considerable reduced
range and increased charging times relative the the incumbent), usage patterns can be
derived from existing data. Furthermore, as these systems are eﬀectively reversed air
conditioning units, their aggregate load characteristics are relatively well understood. As
load cycles may look similar to that of cooling loads in the USA, it may even be possible to
infer their DSR potential from existing data. Nevertheless, assumptions like this should
not be made without some experimental verification. Though the scale of such trials
should not need to be as large as those necessary to test consumer responsiveness to
prices. Here, LCL fills some of the knowledge gaps with the companion reports: B3:
Impact of low voltage connected technologies on power quality [26] and B4: Impact of low
voltage connected low carbon technologies on network utilisation [27].
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3.1 Objectives
At a high level this trial was concerned with the implementation of a dynamic-Time-Of-
Use (dTOU) tariﬀ in order to inform their future use for Constraint Management (CM)
and Supply Following (SF). Through implementing both use cases in the same tariﬀ it
was believed that the trial would be more realistic – in a smart future, demand response
is likely to be used to achieve multiple objectives and by multiple actors – and would
therefore better inform on the potential conflicts and synergies between the two chosen
use cases. The following data objectives were established:
• Ensure statistically robust results: By designing the experiment to detect a minimum
change between trial groups at a given level of confidence.
• Demonstrate the use of the dTOU tariﬀ for constraint management: Events were
designed to achieve substantial demand reductions during the identified annual peak
loading periods.
• Gather data on the distribution of the Demand Side Response (DSR) resource over
time to inform SF: By ensuring an even distribution of events over seasons and day
types, and ensuring that events spanned all times of day with diﬀerent start times.
• Gather data on the eﬀect of event duration on response magnitude: By designing
both high and low price events of varying durations and distributing them using a
randomised-block experimental design.
• Gather data on the eﬀect of household occupancy on response magnitude: Given
the scale of the trial, groups contained representative numbers of diﬀerent household
occupancies.
• Gather data on the eﬀect of the tariﬀ on vulnerable and low-income consumers: By
using Acorn consumer classifications (a non-invasive measure) to guide sampling,
ensuring significant number of such consumer types.
• Gather data on the eﬀect social classification on response magnitude: By using Acorn
classifications to stratify consumers during analysis.
• Ensure the applicability of results to London: By using Acorn consumer classifica-
tions to ensure trial groups were reasonably representative of London as a whole.
• Gather metadata on the types of loads shifted: By using surveys and interviews
to obtain extensive metadata on household and appliance composition, as well as
consumer attitudes.
3.2 High level design decisions
This section lists the key design decision made in consortium with programme partners. A
brief rationale is given where appropriate. More detail can be found in the accompanying
report on consumer attitudes [1].
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3.2.1 Trial sample groups
Households on the trial were split into two groups:
• dTOU group: receiving the experimental dTOU tariﬀ.
• non-Time-Of-Use (nonTOU) group: receiving a standard flat tariﬀ, one of EDF
Energy’s existing commercial oﬀerings.
3.2.2 Technical and resource
Resource constraints mainly concern project finance and will not be discussed in detail,
save to mention the constraints that they imposed on the trial design. Technical constraints
were imposed by the capabilities of the systems available for use on the trial. Key decisions
relating to this were:
• Up to 6000 smart meters available for the trial.
• 1 year trial duration.
• 30 minute time resolution: This was the highest measurement resolution possible
given Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and smart meter specifi-
cations [9].
• 3 price bands: The smart meters had 3 price registers, thus allowing a maximum of
3 price bands.
• Notifications via the mobile network Short Message Service (SMS): The cost and
complexity required to develop other solutions, for example phone applications or a
web service, was considered uneconomical for the programme. Using SMS, it was
possible to send notification messages to customer’s mobile phones and to the smart
meter in-home display, as show in figure 3.1. An example message reads, “From 5am
Thurs 21st to 5am Friday 22nd your rate is LOW except HIGH 7am-10am”.
Figure 3.1: In-home display showing a rate change notification and indicating a low current
load (green light).
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3.2.3 Business and social
Social constraints stem from ethical obligations relating to intervening in people’s lives
and collecting their personal data. Business constraints stem from both the industrial
partners’ business processes and the imperative not to damage their respective businesses;
trial participants were also the customers of the partnership organisations. Particular
care was taken to ensure that customer relationships were not damaged by the trial and
that any personal data was kept securely and in accordance with a data privacy strategy
approved by the Oﬃce of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem). Key decisions in this area
were:
• Opt-in trial: Consumers had a choice in whether their personal details could be used
in the trial. This was true both for the treatment dTOU group and the nonTOU
group. The sampling is explained in more detail in later sections.
• London area only: Recruitment was restricted to the London distribution network
administration area (LPN) only. This was principally because the trial was designed
to give information about urban areas, and in particular the London area, but also
because of the availability of network data within this area.
• Up to 3 event days1 per week in order to limit inconvenience to consumers.
• Up to 1 double (up-down or down-up) price band change per week: There was some
concern that consumers would be confused or irritated by an overly complex tariﬀ
structure. This was considered to be the maximum acceptable complexity for the
tariﬀ. The detail which could be communicated via SMS was also a key consideration
in this decision.
• Notifications made a minimum of 24 hours ahead of delivery: Though any consumer
notification period was technically possible, to limit customer dissatisfaction and
allow people a reasonable time to react to price changes, it was decided that notifi-
cations would be sent at 8:30am on the days preceding events.
• Revenue neutral price bands: The tariﬀ was designed so as to result in no annual
change in bill for Elexon2 Profile Class 1 consumers who did not react to the dTOU
tariﬀ. This was in accordance with the rules for trials as laid out by Ofgem.
3.2.4 Metadata
In addition to the smart meter data, metadata was collected from the following sources:
• Appliance survey: Appliances in the home and metrics on the home itself (e.g. num-
ber of rooms, occupants.).
• dTOU survey: Relating to the attitudes of consumers towards the tariﬀ and engage-
ment with the tariﬀ.
• Consumer interviews: To facilitate a longitudinal study of consumer attitudes [1].
• Post trial survey: Changes in attitudes and overall views of the tariﬀ.
Not all the above sources were relevant to this report; this dataset also contributes towards
other Low Carbon London (LCL) outputs.
1An event day is any day containing a price band other than the default price.
2Elexon is responsible for administering the Balancing and Settlement Code within the UK electricity
system.
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3.3 Recruitment and sample demographic
The salient details of the trial recruitment process are described. For more detail an
interested reader should view the companion report on consumer attitudes [1].
3.3.1 Recruitment process
London
EDF Energy customers
LCL
N_total = 5533
N_nonTOU = 4414
dTOU
N_dTOU =1119 
Figure 3.2: Venn diagram illustrating sample selection with final recruited numbers.
Recruitment onto the trial was managed by EDF Energy, working closely with Imperial
on points concerning experimental design. Figure 3.2 illustrates the sampling population
subsets. The trial recruitment steps can be summarised as:
1. Primary recruitment into the LCL residential trial programme. Participants were
recruited from EDF Energy customers within the London Power Networks (LPN)
area. There was a need to ensure the demographic spread of individuals was similar
to that of London. As a non-intrusive measure, this was monitored using the Acorn
consumer classifications described in table 3.2.
2. Install smart meters and In-Home Displays (IHDs) in participant’s homes. At this
point the technician would explain the operation of the meter and IHD. For a variety
of technical reasons it was not possible to install smart meters into all the homes
recruited. In this case, primary recruitment was repeated until recruitment targets
were met.
3. Secondary recruitment into the treatment group. Participants were recruited from
the set of existing primary programme participants. The treatment group, in this
case, were those who would be receiving the Time-Of-Use (TOU) tariﬀ. Those not
recruited into treatment group formed the nonTOU group.
It should be noted that, because secondary recruitment was also opt-in, and taken from
the group of households created by the primary recruitment drive, it was assumed that
self selection had created a natural diﬀerence between the populations of the dTOU and
nonTOU groups.
Partly to mitigate the issue of disparities between the groups, and to enhance the
collection of meta-data, customers were oﬀered several incentives. These are discussed
in detail in report A2: Residential consumer attitudes to time-varying pricing [1]. The
salient points are given below:
• A guarantee that they will be reimbursed at the end of trial if they are worse oﬀ on
the dTOU tariﬀ than they would have been on their previous tariﬀ.
• £20 for returning the appliance survey.
• Assurances regarding how many hours would be charged at high price band.
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• £100 for signing up to the dTOU tariﬀ .
• Another £50 if they stay on dTOU tariﬀ until the end of trial.
• £20 for returning the consumer dTOU tariﬀ survey at the end of the trial.
• Entry into a prise draw with completion of the post trial survey.
dTOU selection criteria
In order to be oﬀered the dTOU tariﬀ, customers had to meet a number of conditions.
These conditions were due to both business and experimental design considerations which
will not be discussed in detail here. An interested reader should refer to the companion
report on consumer attitudes [1]. The conditions were:
• Be an existing LCL trial customer.
• Have had their smart meter installed more than 1 month before the trial start.
• Have an IHD installed and working.
• Not be on the Economy 7 tariﬀ.
• Not be on a Dual Fuel tariﬀ: EDF Energy did not want customers to have a customer
experience with gas that was diﬀerent to their experience with electricity; installing
smart gas meters, and implementing a more complex refund process, was not feasi-
ble within the timescales of the project. Approximately 5.4% of the EDF Energy
customers with the LPN area were dual fuel.
• Have a standard smart meter type: Landis and Gyr E470.
• Not have a prepayment meter: No smart meter with a pre-payment facility compat-
ible with existing infra-structure was available at the time of recruitment.
• Not have micro-generation. This is because, clearly, micro-generation aﬀects net
demand profiles, but also micro-generation is known to aﬀect energy use behaviour.
• Not have debt or any special conditions associated with their account.
• Have completed the meta-data survey.
• Not have plans to move home within the first 6 months of the trial.
3.3.2 Final group populations
Figure 3.3 shows the group numbers against time. Final group numbers are given in
table 3.1. Due to the dTOU group being recruited from the nonTOU group and the
recruitment being opt-in, it was not possible to achieve an optimal even split between
both groups.
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Figure 3.3: Population of trial groups with time.
nonTOU dTOU Total
Beginning of trial 4,414 1,119 5,533
End of trial 4,068 1,044 5,111
Attrition rate 7.8% 6.7% 7.6%
Table 3.1: Trial group population numbers and attrition rates.
3.3.3 Demographic composition
Recruitment took place within the LPN area, as show in figure 3.5. As a non-intrusive
measure, Acorn group classifications were used to monitor demographic spread. Figure 3.4
shows the breakdown by Acorn group name of the nonTOU and dTOU groups as compared
to EDF Energy customers within the LPN area. In general, both trial groups were shown
to be reasonably representative of EDF Energy customers in the London area, who were
in turn shown to be representative of London, though this data is proprietary and cannot
be published.
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Figure 3.4: Proportions of Acorn groups for the dTOU group the nonTOU group and EDF
Energy customers in the LPN area. See table 3.2 for label definitions.
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Label Acorn group Acorn category
A Wealthy executives Wealthy achievers
B Aﬄuent greys Wealthy achievers
C Flourishing families Wealthy achievers
D Prosperous professionals Urban prosperity
E Educated urbanites Urban prosperity
F Aspiring singles Urban prosperity
G Starting out Comfortably oﬀ
H Secure families Comfortably oﬀ
I Settled suburbia Comfortably oﬀ
J Prudent pensioners Comfortably oﬀ
K Asian communities Moderate means
L Post industrial families Moderate means
M Blue collar roots Moderate means
N Struggling families Hard pressed
O Burdened singles Hard pressed
P High rise hardship Hard pressed
Q Inner city adversity Hard pressed
Table 3.2: Acorn group names and categories.
510000 520000 530000 540000 550000 560000
160000
170000
180000
190000
200000
North
dTOU
nonTOU
Figure 3.5: Trial household sample locations overlaid on the borough boundary map of
Greater London. Map data from the Greater London Authority [28]. Ordnance
Survey [29] coordinate system.
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3.4 Tariﬀ and schedule design
3.4.1 Parametrisation of demand side response
This section describes the parameters through which a demand response action in the
dTOU tariﬀ can be quantitatively described. As the objective of this trial is to test
consumer response to the tariﬀ, we are only concerned with those attributes of the tariﬀ
which are observable by the consumer.
The salient parameters are listed below. They are not considered to be exhaustive,
indeed many can be subdivided into finer details, rather, they are those that are considered
necessary to inform the design of the tariﬀ.
• Notice period given in advance of event: This may range from almost no advanced
notice, in the case of fast reserve for an unpredicted plant failure, to months ahead,
in the case of regular peak shaving for predictable system load.
• Price at which electricity is sold at time of use: For this trial, three price bands were
available. They will henceforth be referred to as the high, default, and low price
bands.
• Duration for which a DSR action is required: This could range from just a few
seconds per event, as in the case of frequency response, to hours, as might be the
case for use in peak shaving actions.
• Timing of events: Time of day, day of week and season of year were considered.
• Frequency of events: How often the events should occur within the schedule.
• Persistence of events: the number of consecutive days over which an event should
occur. It was a design decision to limit this to a maximum of 3 consecutive days.
3.4.2 Event design
In this trial, price events were considered to be the application of the high or low price
bands. Designing events required picking appropriate DSR parameter values to achieve
the objectives outlined in section 3.1. The design decision to have revenue neutral pricing
meant that the values of the three price bands were dependant on the structure of the
tariﬀ. This left the duration, timing, frequency and persistence of events to be chosen
first. In order to inform these decisions, some cursory analysis was performed for each of
the use cases.
Constraint management events
Network constraints are most likely to occur during the regular peak demand periods.
While the cause of constraints, even in a residential area, may be other than residential
load, for the purposes of designing this trial, the focus was on mitigating residential load
dominated constraints. As such, the predictable peaks in residential load were used as a
proxy for the likely timing and duration of constraints. Elexon’s Profile Class 1 data was
used to inform this.
Figure 3.7 shows the Profile Class 1 data for 2010, split by the Elexon defined seasons.
High demand periods are identified as light red shaded areas. These were the time spans
during which it was considered feasible for a constraint management event to occur. The
seasonal and day-type targeting of CM events was prioritised in order of peak magnitude.
This inevitably meant that they were clustered around the winter months. The final
decision on the location of CM event is described later and summarised in table 3.3.
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To determine the persistence of network constraints, programme partner UK Power
Networks provided historic data on network faults. The durations of some 4,000 network
faults (time of reporting to resolution), are plotted in figure 3.6. It can be seen that,
in the vast majority of cases, fault durations greatly exceed the “3 event days per week”
constraint of this trial. Nevertheless, as a proof of principle, it was deemed useful to
simulate the use of a dTOU tariﬀ for constraint management. In a commercial oﬀering,
greater event persistence may be possible, subgroups of consumers could be interleaved so
as to provide DSR on alternate days, or it may be that DSR is only one component to the
resolution of a sustained outage. It was decided that events would be varied in persistence,
from one and up to the maximum of 3 consecutive days.
Due to the potentially high cost of failing to manage a network constraint, it is likely
that a future dTOU tariﬀ would be structured to incentivise the maximum possible DSR
during the critical period. In this sense it is likely to closely resemble a Critical Peak
Pricing (CPP) tariﬀ. Within the trial’s design constraints, the maximum possible DSR
is likely to be achieved when a high price period is enclosed on both sides by low price
periods, so as to both disincentivise use during the critical period as well as incentivise
load shifting into the periods before and after. CM events were structured accordingly.
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Figure 3.6: Cumulative frequency plot of fault durations. Data from the LPN area, from
2003 to 2011, courtesy of UK Power Networks.
Supply following events
As one of the key drivers for the investigation of dynamic pricing is the increased pene-
tration of renewable generation, the focus was set here. Within the context of the UK,
renewable generation is predominantly wind, and is likely to remain so for at least the next
decade. Though market price will depend on many factors, including generation outturn
and demand at the time, as a rough approximation, it is assumed that wind output will be
a strong determinant. The basic tenet of supply and demand theory, that higher supply
will result in lower prices and vice versa, was assumed. The design of supply following
events was therefore informed to some degree by data and literature on the variability in
wind power output.
Timing of events: Prior work [31] shows that, seasonally, the proportion of annual wind
power is biased towards the winter months, and by time of day, towards the afternoon.
In both these slices, the diﬀerence between highest and lowest output was less than 50%.
This was justification enough to obtain data on all times of day and seasons of year.
Duration of events: To understand the durations of high wind events, analysis of
Elexon’s wind power output data [32] was undertaken.
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Figure 3.7: Elexon’s profile class 1 data, 2010 [30]. Light red shaded areas indicate the
time spans over which it was considered feasible for peaks, and therefore CM
events, to occur.
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Figure 3.8: Wind output, and normalised against expanding maximum. The green line
illustrates a conceptual high wind threshold.
Figure 3.8 shows historic wind output data (above) and normalised agains the expanding
maximum (below) in order to account for capacity increases. The green line indicates a
conceptual ‘high wind’ threshold (arbitrarily chosen). The duration of a ‘high wind’ event
is defined as the continuous time period over which the normalised output is above a chosen
high wind threshold value. The distribution of high wind durations was measured for a
range of threshold values, from 0.1 to 0.9 in increments of 0.1. The following observations
were made:
• The choice of threshold has little impact on the distribution of the durations of the
events.
• 70% of events are below 3 hours in duration.
• Durations of between 3 and 20 hours occupy the next 20% of cases.
From this it was decided that SF event durations of 3, 6 and 12 hours would be used for
high and low events, with a 24 hour duration event for low price alone (it was considered
unreasonable to impose a 24 hour high price on consumers). These numbers were chosen
because they are factors of 24 and thus cleanly subtend the day while also covering the
majority of wind event durations.
3.4.3 Schedule design
The previous section described the drivers behind the design of the individual DSR events.
This section describes their overall incorporation into the trial schedule.
Definition of a trial day
The basic experimental unit in the schedule is a day. It was desirable from an analysis
perspective to define the start and end of a day according to how most people perceive
them. That is to say, it begins when one wakes up in the morning. From the Profile Class
1 data (figure 3.7) it is evident that the lowest demand in a 24 hour period is between the
hours of 3am and 5am, with demand increasing shortly after 5am as people begin to wake.
Approximately in line with the circadian rhythm, 5am was chosen as the beginning of a
‘trial day’.
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Randomised bock design for Supply Following events
A randomised block design [33, Ch. 14] was used in the arrangement of SF events. This
is a form of noise reducing design which allows some of the random errors from a targeted
‘nuisance’ variable to cancel when means are calculated.
In this trial, time of day was the targeted ‘nuisance’ variable. By arranging each block
duration so as to sequentially cover all times of day, some of the inter-day noise would
cancel when averaging over all time blocks of that duration. These events were randomly
distributed throughout the days of the year.
The design constraints of the trial allowed for a fixed number of repetitions per event,
thus a trade oﬀ between event days allocated to SF and CM was necessary.
For SF events, in order to subtend the day with each of the chosen durations, the
following numbers of unique start-times and durations were chosen:
• 8: high price, 3 hour duration
• 8: low price, 3 hour duration
• 4: high price, 6 hour duration
• 4: low price, 6 hour duration
• 3: high price, 12 hour duration
• 3: low price, 12 hour duration
• 1: low price, 24 hour duration
Each of the above were repeated 3 times and randomly scattered throughout the days
of the trial, giving a total of 45 high price events and 48 low price events. A graphical
illustration of the event blocking pattern can be seen later in figure 3.9. The diﬀerent
durations of event can be seen to systematically cover all times of day.
A further 21 event days were available for demonstration of the CM use case, described
next.
Constraint Management events list
Table 3.3 lists all CM events designed for the trial. In this table, the final digit in the
event names identifies the repeat number for that event type. For example, P3_1D_1
is the second instance of event type P3_1D (the first instance being 0 by convention).
Persistence is the number of consecutive days over which peak reduction actions occur.
The ‘peak from’ and ‘peak to’ columns indicate when (measured in local time) the high
price band is applied.
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Name Date from Date to Peak from Peak to Persistence
P1_1D_0 Tue, 23 Apr Wed, 24 Apr 17:00 23:00 1
P1_2D_0 Tue, 26 Nov Thu, 28 Nov 17:00 23:00 2
P1_3D_0 Wed, 01 May Sat, 04 May 17:00 23:00 3
P3_1D_0 Tue, 29 Jan Wed, 30 Jan 7:00 10:00 1
P3_1D_1 Thu, 21 Mar Fri, 22 Mar 7:00 10:00 1
P4_2D_0 Wed, 20 Feb Fri, 22 Feb 17:00 23:00 2
P4_3D_0 Wed, 27 Mar Sat, 30 Mar 17:00 23:00 3
P6_1D_0 Sun, 13 Oct Mon, 14 Oct 17:00 23:00 1
P6_1D_1 Sun, 20 Oct Mon, 21 Oct 17:00 23:00 1
P8_1D_0 Sat, 09 Feb Sun, 10 Feb 10:00 14:00 1
P9_1D_0 Sun, 15 Dec Mon, 16 Dec 17:00 23:00 1
P9_2D_0 Sat, 19 Jan Mon, 21 Jan 17:00 23:00 2
P9_2D_1 Sat, 16 Mar Mon, 18 Mar 17:00 23:00 2
Table 3.3: List of CM events. Visualised in figure 3.9.
Price bands
As the first trial of its kind in the UK, there was some uncertainty as to the level of response,
if any, that dynamic pricing would have on consumption. It was therefore considered
prudent to set price bands so as to maximise the expected response, and therefore the
chance of detecting a change in consumption. Furthermore, as related trials of a static
TOU type have, for a variety of reasons, tended towards more conservative price band
ratios, it was of interest to enter new territory with a greater price ratio.
As consumer bills should be revenue neutral in the case that they did not respond to
DSR events, the values of the high, low and default price bands were somewhat dependant
on each other. Price bands were:
• High price: 67.2 pence/kWh
• Default price: 11.76 pence/kWh
• Low price: 3.99 pence/kWh
The nonTOU tariﬀ group was charged at fixed rate of 14.228 pence/kWh.
Final pricing schedule
Figure 3.9 gives a graphical representation of the unique events in the trial. The first letter
refers to whether it is a high price, ‘H’ or low price ‘L’ for SF events. ‘Pn’ is used for peak
targeting CM events, where n was a reference used to identify unique season-day-time
combinations. For SF events, the last two digits refer to the starting hour. For CM events,
the last two digits refer to persistence: 1, 2 or 3 consecutive days (‘D’).
The full pricing tariﬀ schedule can be seen in figure 3.10. Note, care was taken to ensure
that events did not occur on the day of the change from Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)
to British Summer Time (BST) due to the complications this might present in analysis.
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Figure 3.9: Depiction of event types. ‘H’ and ‘L’ prefixes are used for SF events, ‘P’ for
CM events. Settlement blocks are arranged in the order in which they occur in
the trial day. Details of the CM events (‘P’ prefix) can be found in table 3.3.
33
3 Trial design
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 0 2 4 6 8 10
Settlement block
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
High price Low price Weekends
Figure 3.10: Event schedule in local time.
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4.1 Data
4.1.1 Sources
A summary of the data collected during this trial is given below:
• One year of consumption data measured at 30 minute resolution from
– 1,044 households on the experimental dynamic-Time-Of-Use (dTOU) tariﬀ
– 4,068 households receiving the non-Time-Of-Use (nonTOU) tariﬀ.
• Installation survey results for
– 764 households on the dTOU tariﬀ
– 1,827 households on the nonTOU tariﬀ.
• Appliance survey results for
– 959 households on the dTOU tariﬀ
– 1,870 households on the nonTOU tariﬀ.
• Up to 6 months pre-trial consumption data, where available, for both dTOU and
nonTOU groups.
• Acorn consumer classifications for all 5,533 households within the trial.
4.1.2 Coverage
Figure 4.2 shows a heat map of missing data over the trial year. In general, no more than
3.4% of data was missing in any one 30 minute measurement period, the mean missing
data per period being 0.17%, with a standard deviation of 0.11%. No structure could be
discerned in the missing data.
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Figure 4.1: Histogram and cumulative percentage of households for the hours of missing
data in the trial.
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Figure 4.2: Heat map of missing data during the trial year.
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The histogram and cumulative distribution of the total number of hours of missing data,
for each household, is shown in figure 4.1. The median missing data period was 1 hour,
though the distribution has a long tail, with small numbers of households having large
numbers of missing data hours. 80% of households had less than 10 hours of missing data
during the trial year.
4.1.3 Cleansing
Not all households within the trial were suitable for analysis. Households were excluded
if they:
• Asked to be removed from the trial.
• Were on a list of households manually determined to be unsuitable for the trial:
For example, households in the nonTOU group which were later found to be on a
non-standard tariﬀ such as Economy 7.
• Had more than one smart-meter meter installed: Some households had more than
one meter installed due to a fault with the original. Aside from the missing data
which often ensued, for reasons related to how the data was stored and collected,
this was undesirable for analysis.
• Did not have consumption data spanning the trial year: In other words, if they
joined or exited the trial during the trial year.
• Had more than 50 hours of missing data over the trial year: This excluded 11% of
households in the trial.
After exclusions, the group populations stood at:
• dTOU: 922 households.
• nonTOU: 3,437 households.
It was possible that the exclusions had skewed the relative representation of social
demographics between trial groups. A comparison across Acorn groups found that no
notable changes had occurred. As a further sense check, and to see if there were any
major discrepancies between the groups, daily average profiles were compared. Figure 4.3
shows average daily profiles for the Elexon seasons and days of the week. It can be seen
that, while the dTOU group tended to have lower demand than the nonTOU group, they
followed the same trend across the seasons.
4.2 Measuring demand response
Demand Side Response (DSR) is defined as change in demand as a result of a price signal,
relative to the demand that would have been had the price signal not been sent. We shall
call this the baseline demand. DSR can therefore be defined as:
DSR = Dactual −Dbaseline (4.1)
whereDactual is the actual demand measured, andDbaseline is a calculated baseline demand
which represents what the household would have consumed had the price signal not been
sent. The units of DSR in this report are kW. Defining DSR was therefore a question of
calculating the demand baseline.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of nonTOU and dTOU group load profiles.
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The inference of the dTOU group baseline demand is greatly enhanced by making use of
the nonTOU group. Although their make-up is slightly diﬀerent both groups were subject
to the same external variables, such as weather and public holidays, and showed similar
shaped load profiles (figure 4.3). The nonTOU group therefore presented a way in which
to ‘black-box’ many highly complex external variables into one measured variable. The
task of baselining was became that of defining the relationship between the nonTOU group
and the dTOU group. Which is to say, Dbaseline would then be some function of nonTOU
demand.
4.2.1 Training data
In order to understand the relationship between the demand measured in the nonTOU
group and the dTOU group, data where this relationship was isolated (unperturbed by
DSR events) was required.
Figure 4.4 shows the diﬀerence between nonTOU and dTOU group demand for all data
recorded. The standard error of the mean group demand diﬀerence is plotted to give a
sense of the confidence in the value of the group diﬀerence. During the trial period, it is
interesting to note that DSR events can be seen as extended spikes above and below the
group diﬀerence’s normal range.
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Figure 4.4: Diﬀerence between nonTOU and dTOU group means (across households)
against time for all recorded demand data.
Fluctuations in first six months are consistent with statistical noise from low sample
numbers. This underlines the necessity to use large samples in trials. Data before the
beginning of July 2012 was therefore discarded.
In order to increase the amount of training data available, trial days (see section 3.4.3
for definition) without events were included in the training set. Of course there could
have been eﬀects form events which spanned more than the day of the event itself, but to
assume this would have left too little training data.
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Training data was defined as all data after July 2012 which did not contain an event
within the trial day.
4.2.2 Model selection
To understand the relationship between nonTOU and dTOU demand, they are plotted
against each other in figure 4.5. It is immediately clear that the general trend is one of
a linear relationship. This is confirmed by the linear and quadratic best fit line being
superimposed over each other. Despite the high R2 value for the linear model, it was
believed worthwhile to attempt some improvement from a higher order model based on
load alone; estimation of DSR depended solely on the quality of this model.
A linear regression model was used to calculate baseline demand for the dTOU group.
To improve the model, temporal trends in the group diﬀerence were examined; if prominent
features were found, they could be included in the model as regression variables.
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Figure 4.5: NonTOU demand against dTOU demand for all training data, with linear and
quadratic best fit lines.
4.2.3 Regression variables
To examine temporal trends, group diﬀerence time-series data was aggregated and aver-
aged over over diﬀerent periods. Figure 4.6 shows the mean diﬀerence between nonTOU
and dTOU group demand, aggregated by month. While fluctuation is observed, it does
not appear to be cyclic with the months; the lowest and highest demand are both for the
month of November. Furthermore, fluctuation is well within the bounds of what might
be expected given its standard error. Monthly fluctuation were therefore dismissed as not
relevant to the model.
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Figure 4.6: Mean diﬀerence between nonTOU and dTOU group demand, aggregated by
month.
Figure 4.7 shows the mean diﬀerence between nonTOU and dTOU group demand, ag-
gregated by day of week and hour of day. Clear cyclic variation can be seen across both
days and hour-of-day. With a narrower standard error margin relative to the diﬀerence
magnitude, it is a more definite relationship.
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Figure 4.7: Mean diﬀerence between nonTOU and dTOU group demand, aggregated by
day of week and hour of day.
With only the single variable, nonTOU mean demand, the linear model looked good
with and R2 value of 0.9886. However, it could not capture non-linear variation in the
relationship, such as diﬀerences caused by day of week. A linear approximations of such
cyclic variations can be made if there is enough training data. As the training data set
contained almost 25,000 diﬀerent points in time, this was a viable option.
By creating binary variables for each hour of each day-of-week, a total of 7× 24 dummy
variables – where each variable is 1 if the measurement is in that hour and day-of-week
combination, else 0 – the linear regression solver eﬀectively created an independent linear
model for each hour of the week. Doing this improved the fit to an R2 score of 0.9902, or
put another way, the unexplained variance between prediction and actual was reduced by
14%.
With the training data spanning over 1.5 years, it was likely that some load growth
occurred during this time. To incorporate linear load growth into the model, an additional
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dummy variable was added. A counting variable, starting at 0 for the first measurement,
and incrementing by 1 for every subsequent 30 minute measurement block, allowed the
solver to ‘discover’ a linear load growth term. This addition to the model reduced the
unexplained variance by a further 7%, giving a final R2 value of 0.9908.
Throughout this process, bootstrap cross-validation was used to check for and avoid
overfitting.
4.2.4 Missing values
It is was necessary to have a complete input data set for the training of the model and
for its use in predicting the dTOU baseline. The only measured input variable was the
mean demand of the nonTOU group. Due to the number of households in this group
being large (3,437), it was highly unlikely that a significant number of households would
be missing data concurrently. This was the case and can be seen from the time-series plots
of the number of households with data in figure 4.4. For the whole time period over which
training and prediction took place, the number of households from which the nonTOU
mean was calculated did not fall below 500, and for the most part was over 900. The
process of taking the mean eﬀectively filled in the missing data.
4.2.5 Baseline model
The liner model used to predict baseline was finalised as:
Dbaseline,h(t) = αhDnonTOU (t) +
B∑
b=1
βb,hTb(t) + γhG(t) + δh (4.2)
whereDbaseline,h is the predicted baseline demand of dTOU household h at time t; DnonTOU
is the mean demand of the nonTOU group at time t; Tb is the dummy variable correspond-
ing to hour-of-week b, 1 if hour-of-the-week at time t is equal to b, 0 otherwise, B(= 168)
being the total number of hours in a week; G is the growth term at time t, starting at 0
and incrementing by 1 for every subsequent 30-minute measurement block. Greek letters
αh, β1,h, · · · , βb,h, γh and δh are unknown parameters to be determined by the linear
regression solver for each household (h) in the dTOU group.
Analysis was completed using the Python language Scikit-learn library [34].
4.2.6 Per-household analysis
The above method was used to create a bespoke baseline model for each household in the
dTOU group. At the individual household level these results were noisy, which was to
be expected as it is not possible to predict an individual person’s behaviour with great
accuracy. However, as the majority of the analysis involved taking the mean of grouped
measurements, much of this random noise was cancelled.
This approach had the benefit of allowing for intuitive error checking. By allowing DSR
to be calculated as a time-series, in the same format as the actual demand measurements
taken by the smart meters, an appreciation of the accuracy of the model can be gained by
looking at days without price events, where one would expect DSR to be close to zero.
This approach also made it possible to calculate DSR metrics at the individual household
level, a crucial feature of the analysis because it allowed for linking between the power
system and social sides of the trial. The former being more concerned with grouped
response metrics, the latter, in part, looking in depth at the eﬀect of the trial on the
individual consumers [1].
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4.2.7 Significance of results
The analysis of DSR data is generally concerned with detecting significant changes in
behaviour in response to dTOU signals, and furthermore significant changes in the response
between household categories. The term significance is used here in the statistical sense,
which implies that the observed diﬀerence is unlikely to have come about by chance. This
likelihood is quantified using a confidence level, where a common 90% confidence level
implies that the likelihood of observing a reported value by chance is 10% or less.
The per household analysis introduced in the previous section also forms the basis for
quantification of confidence in the results. Any quantity that is to be analysed, say the
average response to all dTOU events in the winter months, is computed independently for
each household. This results in a set of values xi representing all households (i = 1, 2, . . .).
This set forms a distribution with a mean x¯ and a standard deviation σx. For a large
number of households, the Central Limit Theorem implies that the observed mean x¯ is a
normally distributed random variable centered on the true mean with a standard deviation
of σx/
√
N , where N is the number of households involved in the calculation. The quantity
σx/
√
N is known as the standard error of the mean and its magnitude is shown explicitly
for all results in section 5.5, where sample numbers are relatively limited.
Using the mean and standard error, the ubiquitous Z test can be employed to determine
the confidence in the results. For example, a response to a dTOU signal is deemed signif-
icant at a 90% confidence level if it diﬀers from zero by at least 1.65 standard error units.
When statements regarding significance are made, this report adopts a 90% confidence
level unless otherwise stated.
A slightly more elaborate approach is needed to determine the significance of a diﬀerence
between two measured quantities, such as the responses of household categories A and B.
Let the households in category A have a mean response x¯A with an associated standard
error eA and those in category B a mean response x¯B with a standard error eB. When
considering whether there is a significant diﬀerence between x¯A and x¯B, this is equivalent to
asking whether the diﬀerence δA−B = x¯A− x¯B deviates significantly from zero. Assuming
independence of the results between the categories, the standard error associated with the
random variable δA−B is eA−B =
√
e2A + e2B. In this frame of reference, the Z test can
again be used to determine the level of confidence in the results.
Note that comparisons between household categories require larger samples than those
between a single category and a fixed reference value. This is because both the observed
value and the reference value are subject to noise, reducing the significance of results for
any given sample size. In the example above, assuming identical standard errors for the
populations A and B would result in eA−B = 1.41eA = 1.41eB. Therefore, the values
x¯A and x¯B would need to be separated by at least 2.3× eA to be considered significantly
diﬀerent at a confidence level of 90%.
4.3 Responsiveness ranking
Throughout this report the response of households to dTOU signals is analysed in relation
to attributes of households or of trial events. In addition to the objectively measurable
attributes such as event duration or household occupancy an additional metric was devel-
oped that aims to quantify the responsiveness of household to dTOU signals. The purely
data-driven approach to measuring customer engagement with the trials is complementary
with the more qualitative approach described in the companion report [1].
The responsiveness measure aims to rank the participating households according to
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their engagement with the dTOU trial, which is inferred from the degree in which the
household’s energy consumption is adapted to the price signal. To determine this ranking
we compute for each household the likelihood that the actual annual electricity bill came
about by chance (the null hypothesis). If a random response to prices provides a good
match for the actual annual bill it is unlikely that the household has engaged with the
trial, whereas a bill that is significantly lower signals a conscious attempt to follow the
price signal.
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Figure 4.8: Illustration of the use of hypothetical bills resulting from randomised pricing
schedules to identify household engagement with the trial.
The likelihood of a chance realisation of the actual bill is estimated using a bootstrap
approach. The dTOU price signal for 2013 was divided into 365 days and shuﬄed ran-
domly, and the resulting annual bill was computed for each household. This represents
a hypothetical situation where the customer was unaware of the (random) price signal,
but the signal had the same properties as the actual signal. This procedure was repeated
20,000 times to determine a large range of hypothetical bills resulting from random price
signals. Each household’s actual 2013 bill was then compared to the simulated distribution
of outcomes, and the corresponding quantile was determined. If the quantile is very low
(e.g. < 1%), it is highly unlikely that the bill came about by chance, and conversely, if
the quantile is moderate (e.g. ≈ 30%) the household is likely not to have acted on price
signals. This process is illustrated in figure 4.8. The upper panel shows the process for
responsive household, where the distribution of hypothetical annual bills for random price
signals clearly deviates from the realised value. Conversely, the lower panel is generated
for a household that is thought not to have responded significantly to the dTOU signal,
because the random hypothetical bill distribution adequately explains the realised bill.
The computed quantiles were used to establish a responsiveness ranking across all house-
holds in the dTOU group. Even with 20,000 bootstrap iterations, 106 households outper-
formed all generated hypothetical bills, indicating a very significant response. As this
prevented a strict ranking based on quantiles, these households were assigned ranks 1 to
106 at random. All ties resulting from duplicate quantiles (217 in total) were resolved in
this manner. A larger number of bootstrap iterations could in principle be used to increase
the resolution and thus diﬀerentiate between tied households, but small diﬀerences in rank-
ing are unlikely to be relevant considering the unavoidable sources of noise aﬀecting the
results (sample selection, limited number of trials). In this report the ranking is used to
classify households into four groups according to their level of responsiveness, a measure
which is not sensitive to small changes in ranking.
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Figure 4.9: Household performance rank against measured DSR, by price band.
Figure 4.9 demonstrates the relation between the responsiveness ranking and the ob-
served demand response. The panels depict the response to high (left), mid (centre) and
low (right) price signals respectively, and each dot represents a single household, with
its responsiveness ranking on a range of 1 to 922 shown on the x-axis. The estimated
demand response is computed by averaging the deviations from the estimated baseline
consumption over the period in which the relevant price (high/mid/low) is applied.
As expected, highly engaged households (low rank index) tend to decrease their con-
sumption in response to high price signals and decrease their consumption in response to
low price signals, and the magnitude of the response generally decreases with increasing
rank index. Also as expected, the observed deviation at mid price periods is very low and
unrelated to the ranking. Note that the trend is more pronounced with respect to high
price signals than to low price signals, which may be explained by the higher price dif-
ferential used to incentivise demand reduction. These general trends are quantified using
Spearman-rank correlations between the responsiveness ranking and the demand response
metrics in table 4.1.
High price Mid price Low price
Responsiveness 0.81 0.18 -0.47
Table 4.1: Correlation between household’s responsiveness rankings and their year-round
averaged demand response, computed using Spearman’s rank test.
Figure 4.9 also illustrates an interesting feature of the responsiveness ranking method:
the highest ranked households are not necessarily the ones with the highest absolute change
in demand in response to price signals. This is because the method does not quantify
directly the magnitude of the response to price signals, but its consistency and the degree
to which it can be ascribed to chance. This means households with limited means of
demand response may still rank highly if fluctuations in the consumption are clearly linked
to the dTOU signal.
In figure 4.9, we have included bars that represent the average responses of the house-
holds in each quartile. The first bar reflects the behaviour of the households with the
highest engagement, the second bar of the households with slightly lower engagement,
etc. It may be expected that as people become more familiar with the DSR concept, and
particular with the proliferation of DSR automation, future households will become more
responsive to dTOU signals. In this line of reasoning the behaviour of the first quartile(s)
may be considered indicative of the potential for demand response. To evaluate this po-
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tential, we report measurements in chapter 5 for the following four segments of the sample
population:
• average across 25% best responders
• average across 50% best responders
• average across 75% best responders
• average across all households
An example of this aggregate analysis is shown in figure 4.10, which summarises the data
in figure 4.9. The darkest bars reflect the population mean response and the lighter shades
the means of increasingly smaller subpopulations of the best responding households (75%,
50% and 25%).
0.15 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10
Mean DSR (kW/household)
H
M
L
High price
Default price
Low price
Figure 4.10: Summary representation of mean changes in demand over the trial year, by
price band. Bars, from lighter to darker shading, represent the average for
subgroups of the most engaged 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of responders.
One final remark concerns the apparent antagonistic response to high price signals for
the worst-responding quartile of households. This results from using the same data set
both for determination of the ranking attribute and computation of the resulting response.
Inevitably, some of the incidental noise will be picked up by the ranking algorithm, i.e. an
accidental good response cannot reliably be distinguished from a conscious response, and
an accidental bad response cannot be distinguished from antagonistic behaviour. Never-
theless its eﬀect is much smaller than the observed sympathetic demand response and it
may be considered an upper bound for the error on the estimated demand response for the
25% best responders. Note that this does not aﬀect average results across all households
(darkest bars).
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The household response to dynamic-Time-Of-Use (dTOU) signals as observed in the LCL
trials is discussed in this section. After a brief introduction to the analysis and presentation
style adopted in this report, and a high level overview of the results, diﬀerent aspects of the
results are analysed in separate sections. The observed demand response is first classified
by signal type (Supply Following (SF) vs. Constraint Management (CM)) and then by
properties of the signal and social-economic factors related to the household.
5.1 Presentation of results
Demand changes in response to a dTOU signal can be measured and reported using
absolute or relative measures. For the purpose of this report demand response is measured
in terms of absolute deviations in power consumption [kW/household]. This approach
directly quantifies the eﬀect of Demand Side Response (DSR) on the network, and is
therefore particularly well-suited for the application to the SF use case. It is also a
natural candidate for CM applications, when the DNO needs to meet or exceed a certain
load reduction, although if the load is mostly residential this may arguably be achieved
using a relative load reduction. When metrics other than kW/household are used to
represent demand response this will be highlighted in the relevant section.
To gain an idea of how the reported values are likely to impact load profiles, one
should consider the range of demand in a typical profile. Over the non-Time-Of-Use
(nonTOU) group in this trial, the maximum diversified peak demand was found to be
0.99 kW/household in winter, and 0.69 kW/household in summer. The actual value is
strongly related to the type of household. To illustrate, in terms of the LCL Acorn so-
cial categories (explained in detail in section 5.5.3) and occupancy classes, the overall
diversified winter peak demand value of 0.99 kW/household can be disaggregated into:
1 person 2 persons 3+ persons
Adversity 0.54 0.89 1.12
Comfortable 0.64 0.98 1.34
Aﬄuent 0.79 1.16 1.78
Table 5.1: After diversity peak demand for the nonTOU group during 2013 according to
the LCL Acorn classification and occupancy [35].
Further discussion on the eﬀect of diversity can be found in the accompanying LCL
report: Quantifying Demand Diversity of Households [35].
In the context of these diversified peak loads of around 0.5-1 kW/household (summer
and winter) a mean reduction of 0.05 kW/household would amount to a decrease of the
diversified peak demand by more than 5%. Furthermore, the reported demand reductions
are mean values, averaging trial events during the night, which elicit a smaller response,
and events that take place during peak demand times. The actual load reduction during
peak hours – when it is most needed – therefore tends to be higher than suggested by the
mean. The extent of the variability is examined in section 5.4.3.
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As explained in section 4.3, each household participating in the LCL dTOU trial was as-
signed a ranking according to its apparent responsiveness to the dTOU signal. Throughout
this section, results are shown for the following subpopulations, using bars with progres-
sively lighter shading:
• average across all households
• average across the 75% most responsive only
• average across the 50% most responsive only
• average across the 25% most responsive only
The results for highly responsive subpopulations may be taken as indicative of DSR po-
tential in future scenarios where dTOU signals are increasingly familiar to users and ap-
pliances increasingly subject to automation.
When the number of households in a particular analysis is insuﬃcient to make statisti-
cally valid statements regarding the behaviour of its subpopulations only the population
mean response is shown. In those cases, error bars representing the standard error of the
mean are included.
5.2 High level results
This section looks at the high level DSR results across all trials. First, the mean DSR for
high and low price points is presented, alongside the individual events that make up these
aggregate results. The annual mean DSR values are then further analysed by focusing on
households that were identified as particularly good or bad responders.
The mean DSR values for the trial, separated into responses to high and low price points,
can be seen in figure 5.1 (darkest bars). The lighter bars represent the mean observed
DSR for the subpopulations of the 75%, 50% and 25% best responders, respectively. Note
that the most responsive households (lightest shade) produced an average response that
is approximately three times larger than all households combined (darkest shade). Note
that these are average results across all trials, and changes in demand tend to be larger
during high-load periods.
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Figure 5.1: Mean DSR by price band over the trial year for all events. Bars, from lighter
to darker shading, represent the average for subgroups of the most engaged
25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of responders.
5.2.1 Annual event overview
Figure 5.3 (overleaf) provides a visual illustration of the response to dTOU signals through-
out the year. The left panel shows the electricity price signal per day and settlement
block and the right panel displays the observed DSR with the same axes. The colour
scale is clipped to an upper and lower bound of ±0.1 kW/household to ensure visibility
of low-amplitude events, but some events far exceeded these visual bounds. The mini-
mum and maximum observed DSR values over the year were -0.132 kW/household and
48
5 Results and discussion
0.213 kW/household for high and low price events respectively. A comparison between
both panels shows that the high prices correspond well with the blue demand reduction
periods, and the low prices with the red demand increase periods.
As expected, it is apparent from figure 5.3 that the largest responses occur during
the hours when people are generally awake, approximately between seven in the morning
and midnight. Furthermore, from a seasonal perspective it appears that DSR is lower
during the summer months, likely because people are out more or have less loads to shift1.
Furthermore, the responses at the beginning of the year, during winter, appear to be of
greater magnitude than those in the following winter. This is most likely related to the
cold spell in the early months of 2013, but one cannot exclude the possibility that this is
related to the novelty value of the tariﬀ wearing oﬀ.
5.2.2 Change in consumer bills
Because the changes in demand were incentivised using a dTOU tariﬀ structure it is
important to consider the aggregate change in customer’s electricity bills that have resulted
from the trial. This change is analysed below in two distinct ways, highlight diﬀerent
aspects of the observed changes.
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Figure 5.2: Changes in annual electricity bills on the dTOU tariﬀ, relative to the nonTOU
group flat tariﬀ rate of 0.14228 pence/kWh.
Figure 5.2 shows the change in bills relative to what the households would have paid on
the standard flat rate tariﬀ of 14.228 pence/kWh that was used for the nonTOU group.
The average change in annual bills amounted to -4.3%, and 95% of customers achieved
lower bills on the dTOU tariﬀ than they would have on the flat tariﬀ. The dTOU tariﬀ had
been calibrated previously such that it would be cost-neutral to an average non-responsive
consumer, so the overall decrease in bills is consistent with demand response to the dTOU
tariﬀ. However, this does not take into account any structural diﬀerences between the
consumption patterns of the dTOU group and the average (pre-trial) user. Furthermore,
this comparison serves only as a group statistic. At the individual level, some households
may inadvertently have consumption profiles which lead to lower bills on the dTOU tariﬀ
without any active engagement. For these reasons, a second method was devised to serve
as a more accurate indicator of the savings which can be directly attributed to engagement
with the dTOU tariﬀ.
1See the companion report [1] for a detailed account of consumer attitudes
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Figure 5.3: Heat map of price (left) and DSR (right) over the trial year.
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Figure 5.4: Change in annual bill as a result of DSR: the integral of the change in energy
consumed as a result of DSR, and price.
Figure 5.4 shows the change in annual bills for each household, computed by comparing
the actual bill with the equivalent bill computed using that household’s baseline power
consumption model. The dTOU tariﬀ is used in both cases, so this metric isolates the
contribution of the inferred changes in power consumption alone. In this case, the average
dTOU-induced change in annual bills amounted to -2.3%, and 75% of customers achieved
lower bills. While this approach reduces the impact of selection bias and coincident profiles,
it may also fail to capture reductions in overall energy consumption which may have been
inspired by the dTOU tariﬀ. The baseline model aimed to identify short term changes in
load and largely filters out long-term load trends.
Note that the above calculated small decreases in annual bill were the result of a limited
number of targeted experiments. A realistic implementations of dTOU tariﬀs would likely
have diﬀerent price bands and schedules, and may not be subject to the constraint of
cost-neutrality for the average consumer. They may therefore provide households with
additional possibilities to lower their bills.
5.2.3 Household responsiveness and absolute response potential
The households were ranked according to their responsiveness in the trial, as described
in section 4.3. The basic relation between observed price-driven changes in consumption
and the household ranking was shown in that section. Figure 5.5 depicts the observed
changes in electricity consumption in response to high and low price signals for the 25%
highest ranked households, i.e. those that were deemed to have engaged most strongly
with the trials. These households have consistently reduced their consumption at high
price periods (vertical axis) and most have increased their consumption at low price peri-
ods (horizontal axis) - the latter presumably through demand shifting. There is a large
spread in absolute DSR numbers, indicating that small but consistent responses to price
signals may still qualify a household as a good responder. This signifies an important and
desirable property of the ranking methodology: it quantifies a household’s response to the
dTOU signal in relation to its natural variability, thus largely discounting for diﬀerences
in absolute response abilities between households. The radius and colour of the symbols in
figure 5.5 represent the measured annual consumption levels, confirming the intuition that
the households with the largest absolute DSR figures tend to be large electricity consumers.
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Figure 5.5: High and low price DSR for the 25% highest ranked households, with annual
consumption in 2013 indicated by both colour and size of point.
5.3 Constraint Management events
The Constraint Management events are tailored to the management of constrained dis-
tribution networks, by incentivising households to reduce their electricity consumption at
peak times. This is achieved using a high electricity price during peak hours, coupled with
a low price in the surrounding hours, thus enhancing both reduction and shifting of load.
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Figure 5.6: Mean change in consumption in response to CM events.
Figure 5.6 shows the observed deviations in demand over all CM events. Recall that
CM events are inherently imbalanced between low and high price durations in order to
achieve the highest possible demand reduction. The mean reduction during peak hours
amounted to 0.05 kW/household, which tripled to 0.15 kW/household for the 25% best
responders. Both are significant compared to the measured after diversity peak demand
of 1 kW/household. Any demand shifting to the adjacent low price periods was spread
over a larger number of hours, resulting in an average increase in consumption of only
0.02 kW/household.
5.3.1 Reductions in peak and mean demand
The CM events were analysed individually to quantify their success in reducing the peak
load of participating households. To this end the highest realised load among the event’s
high-price hours was identified and compared with the highest hypothetical load level
as estimated using the baseline model. For multi-day events, the peak was taken as
the maximum load attained over all days. The resulting estimates of the relative peak
reduction are plotted in figures 5.7 and 5.8.
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Figure 5.7: Peak demand change over the high price period of the CM events. Refer to
table 3.3 and figure 3.9 for event descriptions.
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Figure 5.8: Mean change in demand over the high price period of the CM events. Bars,
from lighter to darker shading, represent the average for subgroups of the
most engaged 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of responders. Refer to table 3.3
and figure 3.9 for event descriptions.
Peak demand was reduced by approximately 5-10% across the dTOU group. The rela-
tively large variability in this result should be expected, because the peak reduction for a
single event is ultimately computed using only two numbers: the actual peak load and the
estimated baseline peak load, which are both subject to intrinsic variability. For compari-
son, figure 5.8 shows the mean load reduction across all high price hours (not just the peak)
per event. The variability of the population mean (darkest bars) is slightly lower than that
of the peak reduction, centred around an average reduction of 0.05 kW/household. No
significant trends were identified between event persistence (number of consecutive days)
and either peak reduction or mean demand reduction.
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5.3.2 Highlighted Constraint Management events
This section illustrates the observed response to CM events by analysing load profiles for
three events that took place respectively on a weekday morning, a weekend afternoon and
a weekday evening.
Morning, weekday
Figure 5.9 shows a CM event that took place on a weekday morning between 7am and
10am. The black curve depicts the actual power consumption and the inferred increase or
decrease in power consumption compared to the computed baseline is shown in red and
blue, respectively. There is a clear reduction in demand during peak hours, accompanied
by an increase in the subsequent period of approximately five hours. In this case there is
no anticipatory demand increase before the high-price event, probably because the event
took place early in the morning. Although the observed behaviour is consistent with load
shifting it is not possible without detailed per-household analysis to distinguish shifting
of loads from independent load reduction during the high price period and load increase
during the low price period. The semi-transparent curve plotted alongside shows the
result of the same analysis applied only to the 25% most responsive households. For
this subpopulation both the demand reduction and the subsequent demand increase are
significantly enhanced.
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Figure 5.9: CM event P3_1D_1. The lighter shaded Increase, Reduction and Actual
indicate the response from the most engaged 25% of households.
Afternoon, weekend
Figure 5.10 shows a weekend afternoon event. Demand decrease during the high price
period is again accompanied by demand increase during the surrounding low price periods.
This time, with people having been awake for several hours before the high price period,
load increase is visible both before and after the event.
54
5 Results and discussion
Sat, 09 Feb Sun, 10 Feb Mon, 11 Feb
06 12 18 00 06 12 18 00 06 12 18 00
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
D
e
m
a
n
d
 (
kW
)
Low price High price Increase Reduction Actual
Figure 5.10: CM event P8_1D_0. The lighter shaded Increase, Reduction and Actual
indicate the response from the most engaged 25% of households.
Evening, weekday
The repeated evening peak event shown in figure 5.11 demonstrates the ability to reduce
peak loads on consecutive days. On both event days significant load shifting is visible into
the period before the high price event. As was the case for the morning event in figure 5.9,
the asymmetric nature of the observed shift in load is probably the result of people being
asleep after 11pm, reducing the ability to modify demand.
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Figure 5.11: CM event P1_2D_0. The lighter shaded Increase, Reduction and Actual
indicate the response from the most engaged 25% of households.
5.4 Supply Following events
Whereas the CM events were aimed at the specific use case of peak load reduction, the SF
events are designed to provide a more general insight into consumer response to pricing
signals, with supply demand balancing as a representative use case. The SF trials make
use of a single high or low price signal that is maintained for 3–24 hours.
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Figure 5.12: Mean DSR over all SF events. Bars, from lighter to darker shading, represent
the average for subgroups of the most engaged 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of
responders.
Figure 5.12 shows the average change in demand for all SF events except the 24 hour
low price event (L24_05). This event was excluded to ensure an equal number of low
and high price hours were aggregated, enabling a fair comparison of the mean response
magnitudes. The response to low price signals (0.04 kW/household increase) was slightly
larger in magnitude than the response to high price signals (0.03 kW/household decrease).
As was the case for CM events, the mean change in demand of the 25% best responding
households is approximately three times larger. The greater magnitude of response from
low price events is perhaps surprising considering the asymmetry in the price incentives:
consumption during high price periods was penalised by £0.55/kWh relative to the mid
price, while shifting consumption to a low price periods was rewarded (compared to mid
price) by only £0.08/kWh.
5.4.1 High price events
Figures 5.13 to 5.15 depict the observed load profiles and inferred changes in demand level
for three high price events, with a duration of 3, 6 and 12 hours, respectively. A reduction
in demand is visible in all cases, although the early morning event illustrates that the
reduction with respect to the baseline profile increased only gradually as people woke up
on Sunday morning. As for the CM events, the best responding 25% of households (lighter
curve) shows a much more pronounced demand reduction in all cases.
Curiously, although there is a significant reduction in demand during the high price
periods, there does not appear to be a corresponding increase in demand in the surrounding
mid price periods. This is qualitatively diﬀerent from the CM events, where the high price
period was flanked by low price windows and which did trigger a demand increase.
5.4.2 Low price events
Figures 5.16 to 5.18 depict the observed load profiles and inferred changes in demand level
for three low price events, with a duration of 3, 6 and 24 hours, respectively. All events
show appreciable levels of increased demand, especially at those times where the demand
was already anticipated to be high. However, saturation appears to set in for the second
half of the 24 hour period in figure 5.18.
The first event in figure 5.16 took place in the evening on a late autumn Sunday, where
people were apparently able to shift demand to the low price period, as evidenced by the
demand reduction in the afternoon. Such a clear load shifting signature is not present in
the other events, which took place on weekdays.
Finally, as expected the performance of the 25% highest ranked households outstrips
the performance of the general population in all three examples. In fact, in figure 5.17
the inferred increase in demand is so high that the resulting morning demand peak would
exceed the evening peak as a result of the low price signal. This is an important finding
for a future in which households are set to become increasingly responsive to dynamic
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Figure 5.13: SF event: H3_17_0. The lighter shaded Increase, Reduction and Actual
indicate the response from the most engaged 25% of households.
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Figure 5.14: SF event: H6_05_0. The lighter shaded Increase, Reduction and Actual
indicate the response from the most engaged 25% of households.
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Figure 5.15: SF event: H12_11_0. The lighter shaded Increase, Reduction and Actual
indicate the response from the most engaged 25% of households.
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Figure 5.16: SF event: L3_17_2. The lighter shaded Increase, Reduction and Actual
indicate the response from the most engaged 25% of households.
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Figure 5.17: SF event: L6_05_0. The lighter shaded Increase, Reduction and Actual
indicate the response from the most engaged 25% of households.
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Figure 5.18: SF event: L24_05_0. The lighter shaded Increase, Reduction and Actual
indicate the response from the most engaged 25% of households.
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pricing signals. A signal meant to stimulate demand at a system level (supply following)
may thus trigger unexpected local network constraints. This highlights the need for an
integrated approach to generation and distribution system operation and planning.
5.4.3 Temporal determinants of response magnitude
The results in figures 5.13 to 5.18 suggest that consumer responsiveness to dTOU pricing
is highly dependent on the timing and duration of the event in question. In this section
the observed changes in demand are analysed as a function of event duration and their
timing by season, month, day-of-week and hour-of-day.
Duration of events
Figure 5.19 shows the breakdown of DSR by event duration. Mean demand reduction in re-
sponse to a high price event is approximately constant at a mean level of 0.03 kW/household
for all households, increasing to approximately 0.08 kW/household for the best respon-
ders. Incidentally, these values are the same, albeit in the opposite direction, as the mean
changes in demand resulting from prolonged low price periods (12 and 24 hours). However,
shorter low price events result in larger demand increases up to 0.05 kW/household for all
households or 0.16 kW/household for the 25% best performing households. This suggests
that consumers make opportunistic use of low prices during the initial hours of an event.
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Figure 5.19: Eﬀect of event duration on DSR. N is the number of events over which the
mean was taken. Bars, from lighter to darker shading, represent the average
for subgroups of the most engaged 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of responders.
Season and months
Figure 5.20 shows mean DSR by the Elexon defined seasons and figure 5.21 provides a
breakdown by month. As expected, the ability to reduce demand is highest in the colder
and darker winter months, decreasing dramatically during the high summer and early
autumn months. However, the ability to increase demand is impacted to a far lesser
extent.
Day of week
Figure 5.22 shows the DSR breakdown by days of the week. There is no clear trend, except
for a slightly enhanced response to low price signals on Fridays and Saturdays.
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Figure 5.20: Mean DSR by Elexon seasons. Bars, from lighter to darker shading, represent
the average for subgroups of the most engaged 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of
responders.
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Figure 5.21: Mean DSR by month. Bars, from lighter to darker shading, represent the
average for subgroups of the most engaged 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of
responders.
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Figure 5.22: Mean DSR by day of week. Bars, from lighter to darker shading, represent
the average for subgroups of the most engaged 25%, 50%, 75% and 100% of
responders.
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Time of day
Figure 5.23 shows a breakdown of DSR by time-of-day. This is further refined in figure 5.24,
which adds a subdivision by Elexon seasons. The gaps in the graph indicate an absence
of events during those hours in the season. Note that when relevant events are available
these are generally sparse, leading to significant fluctuations in figure 5.24 in particular.
Nevertheless, the results clearly demonstrate that price-driven changes in demand are most
abundant during the waking hours of the day.
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Figure 5.23: Full year mean DSR by settlement block. Bars, from lighter to darker shading,
represent the average for subgroups of the most engaged 25%, 50%, 75% and
100% of responders.
Crucially, this means DSR is most prevalent during the times when it is most likely to
be needed for constraint management, during the winter high demand periods. As can
be seen in figure 5.24, in winter the 50% best responding households can achieve demand
reductions of 0.1 kW/household during the periods of the morning and evening peaks. A
potential concern for DNOs is the limited ability to reduce power consumption during high
summer afternoons. With the increased dependence on air conditioning in oﬃce buildings
in particular, high summer conditions are joining the winter peaks in defining binding
network constraints.
From a supply following perspective, the potential to increase or decrease power con-
sumption during the nighttime hours looks limited, particularly during the summer, due to
the low potential to manually adjust demand at this time. However, increased penetration
of home automation technology may change this.
61
5 Results and discussion
High price Low price
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
D
S
R
 (
kW
/h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
)
Winter
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
D
S
R
 (
kW
/h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
)
Spring
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
D
S
R
 (
kW
/h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
)
Summer
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
D
S
R
 (
kW
/h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
)
High summer
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48
Settlement block
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
D
S
R
 (
kW
/h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
)
Autumn
Figure 5.24: Seasonal mean DSR by settlement block. Bars, from lighter to darker shading,
represent the average for subgroups of the most engaged 25%, 50%, 75% and
100% of responders.
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5.5 Social stratification of response
The previous sections have quantified the changes in demand in response to CM and SF
events and their properties. This section presents a complementary analysis that considers
the properties of the receiver instead of the signal. High level social indicators are used
to quantify and understand the observed measures of demand response. Acorn group and
household occupancy are first examined separately and then combined in an aggregated
format using the ‘LCL Acorn’ classification.
In the case of SF events, all events except the 24 hour how price events (L24_05) were
examined. This ensured that an equal number of low and high price hours were aggregated,
therefore allowing a direct comparison of the high and low price response magnitudes. For
CM events, this was not possible due to the asymmetric nature of the event design; low
price hours greatly outnumbered high price event hours.
5.5.1 Acorn group
Figures 5.25 to 5.26 show a breakdown of DSR by Acorn group for SF and CM events,
respectively. While it is clear that certain groups perform better than others, there is
only a minimal correlation with the albeit loose Acorn trend of decreasing wealth from A
to Q. It should be noted that results from groups with low sample numbers may not be
representative of their populations, as indicated by the error bars.
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Figure 5.25: Mean DSR by Acorn group. SF events only. N is the number of households
in each group, and the standard error of the mean is indicated by black bars.
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Figure 5.26: Mean DSR by Acorn group. CM events only. N is the number of households
in each group, and the standard error of the mean is indicated by black bars.
5.5.2 Household occupancy
Figures 5.27 to 5.28 shows a breakdown of DSR by number of household occupants for SF
and CM events, respectively. The results show a qualitative diﬀerence in the response to
high and low price events. The demand reduction for a high price signal clearly increases
with occupancy counts up to three. Results for higher occupancy counts are insuﬃciently
precise to extrapolate this trend beyond three occupants. The demand increase resulting
from low price events appears to show a similar trend, but less pronounced and with less
significance (see the error bars).
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Figure 5.27: Mean DSR by number of household occupants. SF events only. N is the
number of households in each group and includes only those for which survey
data was available. The standard error of the mean is indicated by black
bars.
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Figure 5.28: Mean DSR by number of household occupants. CM events only. N is the
number of households in each group and includes only those for which survey
data was available. The standard error of the mean is indicated by black
bars.
5.5.3 LCL Acorn and occupancy classifications
Abstracting from the occupancy and Acorn classifications, a 3× 3 high level social classi-
fication system was created specifically for the LCL project, for use in analysis between
Low Carbon London (LCL) programme partners and across reports. The social class
definitions are derived from the Acorn group definitions (see table 3.2):
• Aﬄuent: Acorn groups {A, B, C, D, E}.
• Comfortable: Acorn groups {F, G, H, I, J}.
• Adversity: Acorn groups {K, L, M, N, O, P, Q}.
The orthogonal occupancy classes are:
• 1 person.
• 2 people.
• 3 or more people (3+).
Load profiles
To provide context for the social breakdowns of DSR, average day profiles of nonTOU
group are shown in figure 5.29, for the LCL Acorn and occupancy classes. It can be seen
that there is a significant diﬀerence in load profiles between social groups and occupancies.
It is worth underlining the value of smart meter data for increasing visibility of demand
profiles for individual households. This data can be used to enable more accurate load
forecasting for system balancing, load growth analysis for network planning, improved
network visibility for operation, and to target tariﬀ and energy saving initiatives more
eﬀectively. An example of novel use of smart meter data is the analysis performed in the
LCL report, Quantifying Demand Diversity of Households [35].
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Figure 5.29: Average daily profiles of nonTOU group, plotted for the LCL Acorn and
occupancy classes.
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Demand response
A breakdown of DSR by the above LCL social and occupancy classes is presented for SF
events in figure 5.30 and for CM events in figure 5.31. The figures clearly demonstrate
a trend of increasing responsiveness according to occupancy levels for the Aﬄuent and
Comfortable groups, but this trend is less significant for the Adversity class. Furthermore,
large (3+) Aﬄuent households clearly outperform all other groups with respect to their
demand reduction (0.11 kW/household) specifically in response to CM events.
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Figure 5.30: Mean DSR by LCL Acorn and occupancy class. SF events only. N is the
number of households in each group, and the standard error of the mean is
indicated by black bars.
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Figure 5.31: Mean DSR by LCL Acorn and occupancy class. CM events only. N is the
number of households in each group, and the standard error of the mean is
indicated by black bars.
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In this section we summarise the main results of the trial and discuss their implications.
Finally, avenues for further research are indicated.
Trial design and methodology
This report has presented the results of the Low Carbon London dTOU trials. As part
of this project 5,533 households signed up to have a smart meter installed and their data
analysed. Of those, 1,119 households additionally opted in to receive a dTOU tariﬀ. Both
the dTOU and nonTOU groups were representative of the London population, according
to their Acorn classification.
To qualify for the dTOU tariﬀ, participating households had to return a metadata
survey, which provided additional information on the composition of people and appliances
for further analysis. A subset of participants also agreed to be interviewed as part of
research into consumer attitudes to dTOU pricing. The results of that work appear in the
companion report A2: Residential consumer attitudes to time varying pricing [1], whereas
the current report focuses on quantitive analysis of the trial data.
The process of retrieving and collecting half-hourly meter data was mostly reliable, with
less than 0.17% of measurements missing across the trial year. Furthermore, the maximum
amount of missing data in any settlement block was 2.83%. In total 11% of households
were excluded from quantitative analysis of their demand response due to having more
than 50 hours (100 values) of missing data. In addition, attrition rates of 7.8% and 6.7%
were observed for nonTOU and dTOU groups, respectively. The final analysis used data
from 922 households on the dTOU tariﬀ and 3,437 households on the nonTOU tariﬀ.
A linear regression model was used to relate the consumption level of each household
on non-event days to that of the nonTOU group. The model provided a baseline per-
formance against which realised demand response was determined on event days. By
coupling the baseline profile to the behaviour of the nonTOU group it correctly accounts
for non-standard days (e.g. bank holidays) and special events. Simultaneously, insight
into individual household performance is maintained by the use of per-household models.
Customer engagement and aggregate results
Over the trial year, 95% of households on the dTOU tariﬀ received lower annual bills than
they would have had on the standard flat tariﬀ of the nonTOU group. This was less, at
75%, when calculated based on DSR (actual minus baseline demand) only. That the latter
approach calculated lower saving was possibly due to it being less subject to coincidence
in the consumption profiles of unengaged households, and potentially also because it failed
to capture overall demand reduction which may have been inspired by the dTOU tariﬀ.
Although this overall decrease in annual bills is a first indicator of overall engagement,
this does not necessarily extend to individual households. For example, consumers that are
often away during the evening are likely to have missed the CM-type evening peak trials,
resulting in a lower average bills. To classify the engagement of individual households
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with the trials a measure of responsiveness to dTOU signals was developed. It determines
the likelihood that the realised annual bill came about by chance, if the household had
paid no attention to the dTOU signal. If this likelihood is very low, it is assumed that
the household has actively responded to the signal, whereas a high likelihood is consistent
with a lack of engagement. The likelihood measures were used to rank all households
according to their perceived responsiveness to dTOU signals.
As expected, highly engaged households (low rank index) tend to decrease their con-
sumption in response to high price signals and decrease their consumption in response to
low price signals, and the magnitude of the response generally decreases with increasing
rank index. An important characteristic of the responsiveness ranking is that it does not
strictly select for those households with the largest absolute demand response - those tend
to be the largest consumers of electricity. By measuring the statistical properties of a
household’s energy consumption the method also identifies consumers that deliver small
but consistent demand response contributions.
The responsiveness ranking also plays a key role in the extrapolation of results. The
highly ranked households are assumed to be indicative of future consumers that are in-
creasingly responding to dTOU signals, either manually or mediated by home automation
devices and services. To capture this, households were classified into four groups according
to their responsiveness ranking. The results from the most responsive 25% of households
were used as indicative of future demand response potential.
Averaged across all trials and households, the high price signal resulted in a decrease in
demand of 0.04 kW/household relative to the mid price signal, and the low price signal
resulted in an increase of 0.03 kW/household. The most responsive 25% of households
outperformed these values by a factor of three, with a decrease of 0.11 kW/household and
an increase of 0.08 kW/household, respectively.
Constraint Management trials
The CM events consisted of high price periods that targeted peak hours, flanked by ex-
tended low price periods. These events were consistently able to reduce peak demand levels
by 5% to 10%, and the reduction in load during high price periods was always accompa-
nied by an increase in load during the adjacent low price periods. Extended events that
targeted peaks on up to three consecutive days were trialled, and the measured response
was consistent across peaks on diﬀerent days.
The CM events are intrinsically asymmetric with short high price periods surrounded by
long low price periods. This is reflected in the observed response numbers, with an average
demand reduction of 0.08 kW/household and demand increase of 0.02 kW/household. As
expected, the 25% most responsive households delivered a larger response with an average
reduction of 0.15 kW/household and increase of 0.06 kW/household. This illustrates the
potential of DSR to reduce peaks and enhance utilisation of network assets.
The decrease of demand during peak hours and increase during low priced hours is
consistent with load shifting. However, such a signature response was not present in
the high-price-only SF events in which the peak was flanked by mid-price periods, which
suggests that the apparent load shifting may be caused by opportunistic usage of the lower
price electricity. Further investigation is required to identify the cause of this diﬀerence.
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Supply Following trials
Targeted high and low price events were used to establish the potential for consumers
to respond to dTOU signals at diﬀerent times of the day and throughout the year. As
expected, households responded to high price signals with decreases in consumption levels
that were much larger during the colder and darker winter months than in the peak of
summer. Curiously, the ability of households to increase power consumption was only
very slightly aﬀected by the time of year. During the summer months in particular this
led to an asymmetric response to high and low price signals.
A similar pattern is observed when the measured responses were analysed by the hour
of the day. The demand reduction potential reached its maximum magnitude around the
morning and evening peaks (on weekdays). The most responsive quarter of households
achieved a mean demand reduction over 0.12 kW/household during these periods, com-
pared to 0.05 kW/household for the average household. The strong correlation between
demand reduction potential and absolute demand levels is a positive finding for the Con-
straint Management use case, as the reduction potential during peak demand periods will
be higher than suggested by average response numbers.
The opposite ability to increase demand levels was fairly constant during the waking
hours of the day, at a level of 0.05 kW/household across all households and exceeding
0.15 kW/household for the most responsive households. During the night time even the
best responders did not achieve an increase of 0.05 kW/household. These figures suggest an
ability of households to assist in supply demand balancing, but this potential is currently
limited to waking hours and is significantly larger during winter months. The proliferation
of ‘smart appliances’ that can autonomously respond to price signals may provide a more
consistent response as human intervention will no longer be needed to activate it.
The dual objectives of Constraint Management and Supply Following may lead to con-
flicts. For example, an abundance of available wind power or the availability of large
amounts of inflexible nuclear plant during low load conditions may result in very low elec-
tricity prices. From the system perspective it would be beneficial to use dTOU pricing to
incentivise customers to increase their consumption levels. However, doing so might cause
unanticipated stress on the distribution network. Evidence of such situations was seen
during the trials: the 25% most responsive households occasionally responded so strongly
to low price signals that a new aggregate demand peak was created. On the other hand
it is also possible that the two objectives align leading to synergies between system and
network management. This is a common situation when high load conditions coincide
with high marginal costs of supply (e.g. during the winter peak).
Socio-economic factors in demand response
The responses of the targeted SF trials were analysed against two principal parameters
that are known to be strong indicators of energy consumption: household occupancy (1, 2,
3+) and a socio-economic classifier based on the Acorn system. The three socio-economic
groups – Aﬄuent, Comfortable and Adversity – can be interpreted as a rough indicator of
wealth.
Perhaps surprisingly, the socio-economic class had no significant eﬀect on the observed
demand response for these single events, although results on CM events suggest that
households in the Aﬄuent class may respond more strongly to signals that specifically
target peak hours. The measured response does depend strongly on occupancy levels,
with larger households providing responses of larger magnitude.
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Future work
The trial data and result of the analysis presented in this report provide a very solid
basis for future research and development regarding the role of dTOU-mediated demand
response in network operation and planning.
This report has focused on the quantification of the magnitude of demand response and
its application to diﬀerent use cases. Particular attention was given to the identification
of main determinants of demand response, including properties of households and the
dTOU signals. As a result the figures presented in the report are averages across all
relevant events. However, for network-critical operations it is not the average response
that counts, but the worst case response that the households can be counted on to deliver.
The variability and robustness of dTOU-mediated demand response will be analysed as
part of the future LCL report, Reliability performance of smart distribution networks.
The Supply Following trials have established that dTOU signals can be used to increase
or decrease average household demand by varying amounts depending on the timing and
duration of the price signal. Future experiments could refine the results by introducing
more price points to determine price elasticity in a more granular fashion than is possible
with ‘high’ and ‘low’ tariﬀs used here. If the technical and regulatory setup permits, shorter
lead times than the current day-ahead signal may also be investigated, which would permit
more accurate matching of demand with forecasted renewable generation patterns. The
consumer flexibility models from this and future trials will be embedded in system-level
simulations to determine the value represented by this flexibility, ultimately building the
business case for their use.
The results from the Low Carbon London trial have already indicated the real potential
for conflicts between local network and national level supply objectives. Should DSR be
integrated into the business of the DNOs, coordination with suppliers will be essential.
This will be further elaborated in future LCL report Novel commercial arrangements and
smart distribution networks.
Finally, by definition this trial has measured the response of today’s households outfitted
with current appliances. Because network planning procedures and security standards have
long-term implications they should anticipate the response of future households. In this
report a start was made by identifying the contribution of the most responsive households,
but this should be complemented by a bottom up approach to modelling the flexibility of
future consumers.
71
References
[1] R. Carmichael, J. Schofield, M. Woolf, M. Bilton, R. Ozaki, and G. Strbac, “Resi-
dential consumer attitudes to time-varying pricing,” Report A2 for the "Low Carbon
London" LCNF project: Imperial College London, Tech. Rep., 2014.
[2] UK Power Networks, Low Carbon London programme, 2014. [Online]. Available:
innovation.ukpowernetworks.co.uk.
[3] Department of Energy and Climate, “UK Renewable Energy Roadmap,” London,
Tech. Rep. July, 2011. [Online]. Available: www.decc.gov.uk.
[4] Department for Energy and Climate Change, “2050 pathways analysis,” London,
Tech. Rep., 2010. [Online]. Available: www.decc.gov.uk.
[5] G. Strbac, M. Aunedi, D. Pudjianto, P. Djapic, S. Gammons, and R. Druce, “Under-
standing the Balancing Challenge,” Imperial College London and NERA Economic
Consulting, London, Tech. Rep. August, 2012.
[6] UK Parliament, Climate Change Act 2008. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Oﬃce,
Nov. 2008. [Online]. Available: www.legislation.gov.uk.
[7] N. Grid, “Operating the electricity transmission networks in 2020,” National Grid,
Tech. Rep., Jun. 2011. [Online]. Available: www.nationalgrid.com.
[8] G. Strbac, C. K. Gan, M. Aunedi, V. Stanojevic, P. Djapic, J. Dejvises, P. Mancarella,
A. Hawkes, D. Pudjianto, S. Le Vine, and J. Polak, “Benefits of advanced smart me-
tering for demand response based control of distribution networks,” Imperial College
London, London, Tech. Rep., 2010. [Online]. Available: www.cts.cv.ic.ac.uk/.
[9] Department of Energy and Climate Change, “Smart Metering Implementation Pro-
gramme: Smart Metering Equipment Technical Specifications Version 2,” London,
Tech. Rep., 2013. [Online]. Available: www.decc.gov.uk.
[10] Department for Energy and Climate Change, “Demand Side Response in the domes-
tic sector - a literature review of major trials,” Frontier Economics and Sustainability
First, London, Tech. Rep., 2012. [Online]. Available: www.decc.gov.uk.
[11] A. Faruqui and J. Palmer, “The Discovery of Price Responsiveness–A Survey of Ex-
periments Involving Dynamic Pricing of Electricity,” Social Science Research Net-
work, 2012. [Online]. Available: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2020587.
[12] K. Ehrhardt-Martinez, K. A. Donnelly, and J. A. Laitner, “Advanced Metering Initia-
tives and Residential Feedback Programs: A Meta-Review for Household Electricity-
Saving Opportunities,” American Council for an Energy-Eﬃcient Economy, Wash-
ington DC, Tech. Rep., 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.aceee.org/research-
report/e105.
[13] A. Faruqui and S. Sergici, “Household Response to Dynamic Pricing of Electricity—
A Survey of the Experimental Evidence,” Harvard University, The Brattle Group,
Tech. Rep., 2009.
72
References
[14] AECOM, “Energy Demand Research Project: Final Analysis,” Oﬃce for Gas and
Electricity Ombudsman, UK, Tech. Rep., 2011. [Online]. Available: www.ofgem.gov.
uk.
[15] I. Comission for Energy Regulation, “Results of Electricity Cost-Benefit Analysis,
Customer Behaviour Trials and Technology Trials,” Tech. Rep. May, 2011. [Online].
Available: www.cer.ie.
[16] Summit Blue Consulting, “Evaluation of the 2006 Energy-Smart Pricing Plan,” CNT
Energy, Chicago, Tech. Rep., 2007. [Online]. Available: www.smartgridnews.com.
[17] D. J. Hammerstrom, R. Ambrosio, T. A. Carlon, J. G. DeSteese, G. R. Horst, R.
Kajfasz, L. Kiesling, P. Michie, R. G. Pratt, M. Yao, J. Brous, D. P. Chassin, R. T.
Guttromson, O. M. Järvegren, S. Katipamula, N. T. Le, T. V. Oliver, and S. Thomp-
son, “Pacific Northwest GridWise testbed demonstration projects: Part I . Olympic
Peninsula Project,” Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Washington, Tech. Rep.,
2007. [Online]. Available: eioc.pnnl.gov.
[18] D. Crossley, “Worldwide survey of network driven demand-side management projects,”
Energy Futures Australia Pty Ltd, Tech. Rep. 1, 2008. [Online]. Available: www.
ieadsm.org.
[19] J. Stromback, C. Dromacque, and M. H. Yassin, “The potential of smart meter en-
abled programs to increase energy and systems eﬃciency: a mass pilot comparison,”
VaasaETT, Tech. Rep., 2011. [Online]. Available: www.vaasaett.com.
[20] Energy Networks Association, Radio teleswitching service. [Online]. Available: http:
//79.171.36.154/rts.
[21] A. Faruqui, S. Sergici, and J. Palmer, “The Impact of Dynamic Pricing on Low In-
come Customers,” The Brattle Group, Tech. Rep. September, 2010. [Online]. Avail-
able: www.edisonfoundation.net.
[22] Rocky Mountain Institute, “Automated demand response system pilot: Final report,
volume 1,” Tech. Rep., 2006. [Online]. Available: www.smartgridinformation.info.
[23] UK Power Networks, Vulnerable customers and energy eﬃciency, 2014. [Online].
Available: innovation.ukpowernetworks.co.uk.
[24] G. eMotion, Project website, 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.greenemotion-
project.eu/.
[25] M. Aunedi, M. Woolf, M. Bilton, and G. Strbac, “Impact & opportunities for wide-
scale ev deployment,” Report B1 for the "Low Carbon London" LCNF project: Im-
perial College London, Tech. Rep., 2014.
[26] N. Bottrell, E. Ortega, M. Bilton, T. Green, and G. Strbac, “Impact of low volt-
age connected low carbon technologies on power quality,” Report B3 for the “Low
Carbon London” LCNF project: Imperial College London, Tech. Rep., 2014.
[27] M. Bilton, N. E. Chike, M. Woolf, P. Djapic, M. Wilcox, and G. Strbac, “Impact of
low voltage connected low carbon technologies on network utilisation,” Report B4
for the “Low Carbon London” LCNF project: Imperial College London, Tech. Rep.,
2014.
[28] Greater London Authority, London datastore, 2014. [Online]. Available: data.london.
gov.uk.
[29] Ordnance survey, uk. [Online]. Available: www.ordnancesurvey.co.uk.
73
References
[30] Elexon, What are the profile classes? [Online]. Available: www . elexon . co . uk /
knowledgebase/profile-classes/.
[31] G. Sinden, “Wind power and the UK wind resource,” University of Oxford, Envi-
ronmental Change Institute, Oxford, Tech. Rep., 2005. [Online]. Available: www.eci.
ox.ac.uk.
[32] Elexon, Elexon Portal. [Online]. Available: elexonportal.co.uk.
[33] W. Mendenhall and T. Sincich, Statistics for engineering and the sciences. Prentice-
Hall, Jan. 1995, isbn: 9780023805813.
[34] F. Pedregosa, G. Varoquaux, A. Gramfort, V. Michel, B. Thirion, O. Grisel, M.
Blondel, P. Prettenhofer, R. Weiss, V. Dubourg, J. Vanderplas, A. Passos, D. Cour-
napeau, M. Brucher, M. Perrot, and E. Duchesnay, “Scikit-learn: machine learning
in Python,” Journal of Machine Learning Research, vol. 12, pp. 2825–2830, 2011.
[Online]. Available: scikit-learn.org.
[35] I. Konstantelos, M. Sun, and G. Strbac, “Quantifying demand diversity of house-
holds,” Report for the “Low Carbon London” LCNF project: Imperial College Lon-
don, Tech. Rep., 2014.
74
Project Overview
Low Carbon London, UK Power Networks’ pioneering learning programme funded by Ofgem’s Low Carbon Networks Fund, has 
used London as a test bed to develop a smarter electricity network that can manage the demands of a low carbon economy 
and deliver reliable, sustainable electricity to businesses, residents and communities. 
The trials undertaken as part of LCL comprise a set of separate but inter-related activities, approaches and experiments. They 
have explored how best to deliver and manage a sustainable, cost-effective electricity network as we move towards a low 
carbon future. The project established a learning laboratory, based at Imperial College London, to analyse the data from the 
trials which has informed a comprehensive portfolio of learning reports that integrate LCL’s findings. 
The structure of these learning reports is shown below:
A1 Residential Demand Side Response for outage management and as an alternative  
to network reinforcement 
A2 Residential consumer attitudes to time varying pricing
A3 Residential consumer responsiveness to time varying pricing
A4 Industrial and Commercial Demand Side Response for outage management  
and as an alternative to network reinforcement
A5 Conflicts and synergies of Demand Side Response
A6 Network impacts of supply-following Demand Side Response report
A7 Distributed Generation and Demand Side Response services for smart Distribution Networks
A8 Distributed Generation addressing security of supply and network reinforcement requirements
A9 Facilitating Distributed Generation connections
A10 Smart appliances for residential demand response
Distributed 
Generation and 
Demand Side 
Response
Network Planning 
and Operation
C1 Use of smart meter information for network planning and operation
C2 Impact of energy efficient appliances on network utilisation
C3 Network impacts of energy efficiency at scale
C4 Network state estimation and optimal sensor placement
C5 Accessibility and validity of smart meter data
Electrification of 
Heat and Transport
B1 Impact and opportunities for wide-scale Electric Vehicle deployment
B2 Impact of Electric Vehicles and Heat Pump loads on network demand profiles
B3 Impact of Low Voltage – connected low carbon technologies on Power Quality
B4 Impact of Low Voltage – connected low carbon technologies on network utilisation
B5 Opportunities for smart optimisation of new heat and transport loads
Future Distribution 
System Operator
D1 Development of new network design and operation practices
D2 DNO Tools and Systems Learning
D3 Design and real-time control of smart distribution networks
D4 Resilience performance of smart distribution networks
D5 Novel commercial arrangements for smart distribution networks 
D6 Carbon impact of smart distribution networks
Summary SR DNO Guide to Future Smart Management of Distribution Networks 
Low Carbon London Learning Lab
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